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GUNS, DRUGS, AND FEDERALISM:
RETHINKING COMMERCE-ENABLED
REGULATION OF MERE POSSESSION
Marcus Green*
INTRODUCTION

Angel McClary Raich is a California resident who suffers from
many serious medical conditions, including an inoperable brain tumor,
seizures, and chronic pain.1 Following her physician's advice, Raich
has been using marijuana "for over five years, every two waking hours
of every day" to ease her symptoms.2 Diane Monson, another
California resident, suffers from a "degenerative disease of the
spine." 3 On her physician's recommendation, Monson cultivates and
uses marijuana to treat her ailments.4 Since state voters passed
Proposition 215, subsequently codified as the Compassionate Use Act
of 1996,1 cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for such
treatment is legal in California.6
Several states have passed similar laws permitting cultivation and
use of marijuana for medical purposes.7 On the other hand, the
federal Controlled Substances Act 8 ("CSA") provides for criminal
penalties for the "simple
possession" of marijuana and other
"controlled substances." 9 In August 2002, federal agents from the
*J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Professor
Nicholas Johnson for his support, Professor Daniel Richman for his searching
treatment of federal crimes in the classroom, and to Dr. Shobana Shankar for
her strength and unceasing encouragement.
1. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2004).
6. Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(B) (declaring that the Act is intended "[t]o ensure that
patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical
purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to criminal
prosecution or sanction").
7. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229 (listing "Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington" as states that had legalized
medical marijuana).
8. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000).
9. Id. § 844(a) ("It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to
possess any list I chemical...."). The title of § 844 is "Penalties for simple
possession." Id.
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Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), "after a three-hour standoff"
with local law enforcement agents who asserted that the possession
was legal in California, seized and destroyed six cannabis plants from
the home of Diane Monson. 10
Monson and Raich joined in suit against the United States Attorney
General and the Administrator of the DEA seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief barring such enforcement action, contending, among
other claims, that the application of the CSA to their cultivation and
possession exceeded the permissible reach of Congress's commerce
power." The trial court denied the relief sought. 2
In December 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in Raich v. Ashcroft, reversed the district court, concluding that the
CSA "as applied to the appellants, is likely unconstitutional."' 3 The
court of appeals found "a strong likelihood of success" in appellants'
claim that the CSA exceeded congressional commerce power and
remanded to the district court for entry of a preliminary injunction. 4
The Ninth Circuit relied, in large part, on Commerce Clause
doctrine as it has been developed by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Lopez 5 and United States v. Morrison.6 By restricting
regulable activities to those economic in nature or bearing the
characteristics of a commercial transaction or enterprise, these cases
erected a new limit on Congress's power to regulate activities
substantially affecting interstate commerce. 7
In Lopez, i" the Supreme Court invalidated the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990,19 wherein "Congress made it a federal offense 'for
any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone."' 20 The Rehnquist majority2' held that the target of the
legislation, the possession of a firearm in a school zone, was not itself
10. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1225-26.
11. Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
12. Id. at 931 ("Since plaintiffs are unable to establish any likelihood of success on
the merits, their motion for preliminary injunction is denied." (emphasis omitted)).
13. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1234.
14. Id. at 1235.
15. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
16. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil remedy provision of the Violence
Against Women Act).
17. See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229 (appealing to the holdings of Lopez and Morrison,
noting that "[a]s applied to the limited class of activities presented by this case, the
CSA does not regulate commerce or any sort of economic enterprise"); infra Part I.C.
18. 514 U.S. at 549.
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (2000).
20. 514 U.S. at 551 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A)).
21. The four justices who voted with Rehnquist, along with the Chief Justice, have
also been described as the "Federalism Five." See Mark R. Killenbeck, Madison,
M'Culloch, and Matters of Judicial Cognizance: Some Thoughts on the Nature and
Scope of Judicial Review, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 901 (2003) (referring to Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas).
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economic activity and therefore did not affect interstate commerce
22
substantially enough for Congress's commerce power to reach it.
The Lopez decision is central to the so-called "new federalism
revival 3 and has generated a great deal of controversy and debate.24
Before Lopez and after the Supreme Court began upholding far22. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
23. E.g., David J.Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 Duke L.J.
377, 411-26 (2001); see also infra note 27 and accompanying text.
24. Some commentators have decried the shift as an unprincipled attempt by the
Supreme Court to diminish the legitimate role of Congress while pursuing its own
conservative agenda. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress,
100 Mich. L. Rev. 80 (2001); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 TermForeword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2001). Others have moderated by
offering careful historical perspective and analyses to assure that the new
jurisprudence does not represent a return to a brand of anti-civil rights federalism. See
Ronald D. Rotunda, The Implications of the New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence:
An Evolutionary or Revolutionary Court?, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 795, 797 (2003) ("Modernday federalism should not be confused with the 'states' rights' slogan that the slave
owners adopted in the pre-Civil War era or the Dixiecrats adopted in the 1940s and
later."). The more doctrinally-inclined have criticized the Court's rationale, especially
the commercial/noncommercial distinction at work in Lopez, as unsound and
indeterminate. See, e.g., Adam Badawi, Unceasing Animosities and the Public
Tranquility: PoliticalMarket Failureand the Scope of the Commerce Power, 91 Cal. L.
Rev. 1331, 1366 (2003) ("[I]n some instances the Lopez test will not permit federal
jurisdiction even though the theory of political market failure suggests that
centralized regulation would be appropriate."); Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext
Analysis in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1251, 1287 (2003)
("[Tihe Lopez-Morrison doctrine is at war with itself in the most fundamental of
ways."). Still other commentators have thoughtfully probed the invocation of the new
federalism for its potential to operate for the political benefit of minority interests and
outlier norms. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Plenary Power and Constitutional Outcasts:
FederalPower, CriticalRace Theory, and the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments,
57 Ohio St. L.J. 1555, 1567-68 (1996) ("[In relation to rights discourse,] fidelity to
limited power is a conceptually interconnected and equally vital protection of
minority interests."); Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in CriminalLaw,
90 Cal. L. Rev. 1541, 1542-43 (2002) (designating as an "independent norm" a
"community's expression of morality" knowable in its relation to its treatment of
"generally victimless behavior that local and state governments have determined is
blameless, where there is no nationwide consensus (but rather strongly held
diametrically opposed views) on the morality of the behavior"). The legalization of
marijuana use is an archetypal "independent norm." Whether condemned or
celebrated, approaches to the new jurisprudence contain underlying assumptions
about the values associated with federalism and the efficacy of legal doctrine, by way
of judicial review, in shaping social arrangements. See Peter M. Shane, Federalism's
"Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with ConservativeJudicial Activism, 45 Vill. L.
Rev. 201, 243 (2000) (acknowledging the contemporary reality that concentrated
private economic power "is largely unaccountable to any polity whatever" and that in
confronting such a reality "we will have to rely on political actors more formidable
than our judges and acts of creativity more meaningful than the imposition of artificial
doctrinal constraints on Congress' [sic] regulatory powers"). For broader discussion
of extra-legal constitutional processes, see Michael Kent Curtis, Judicial Review and
Populism, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 313 (2003). For some comment on the relevant
impact of the political party "duopoly," see Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political
Parties Under a "Public Rights" First Amendment, 44 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 1939
(2003).
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reaching New Deal legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause,2 5 "[s]ome commentators concluded that the post-1937 Court
would allow Congress to regulate whatever it wanted., 26 However, as
evinced by Lopez and other decisions, the current majority of the
Court has been making a point to rebut that presumption by
attempting to impose categorical limits on congressional power. 7
Applying the new jurisprudence in Raich, the Ninth Circuit
declared a likelihood of success for the appellants' challenge because
it found the wholly local cultivation, possession, and medical use of
marijuana not to be economic or commercial activity. 28 The Ninth
Circuit's conclusion that noncommercial possession of marijuana-for
medical use-likely escapes the reach of federal commerce power may
be read to put a wide range of federal legislative schemes at significant
25. "The Congress shall have the Power To ...regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3; see infra Part I.B.
26. Rotunda, supra note 24, at 800 (citing for example, Archibald Cox, The Role
of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations,40 U. Cin. L. Rev. 199, 259 (1971)).
27. Three interrelated lines of cases embody the effort to "revive" federalism.
First, the Court invoked the Tenth Amendment to proclaim a constitutional
prohibition on federal regulatory regimes that single out state legislative and
executive apparatuses for direct regulation. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Congress "may not conscript
state governments as its agents." Id. at 178. Second, relying on the Eleventh
Amendment, the Court erected new obstacles to congressional abrogation of states'
immunity. See William E. Thro, A Question of Sovereignty: A Review of John T.
Noonan, Jr.'s Narrowing the Nation's Power: The Supreme Court Sides with the
States, 29 J.C. & U.L. 745, 749-52 (2003). Lastly, the Court narrowed the class of
objects and activities subject to federal Commerce Clause regulation.
By
distinguishing between the commercial and noncommercial nature of activities in
judging whether or not activities "substantially affect" interstate commerce, and by
approaching the assessment independently from congressional findings on the
correlation between the targeted activity and interstate commerce, the majority began
to carve out activities unregulable by Congress under the commerce power. See
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609, 614-15 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566;
infra Part I.C. See generally Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress's Power Under the
Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 731, 731
(2003) ("There is little doubt that the Supreme Court, at least as currently constituted,
is really serious about the existence of true limits on Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause, and the justices' capacity to enforce them.").
28. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he marijuana at
issue ...is... non-fungible, as its use is personal and the appellants do not seek to
exchange it or to acquire marijuana from others in a market."). The Ninth Circuit has
been the most literal in applying the post-Lopez doctrine to as-applied challenges of
possession regulations. Shortly before Raich, the Ninth Circuit held that the federal
prohibition of "the possession of child pornography made with materials that have
traveled in interstate commerce" was "unconstitutional as applied to simple intrastate
possession of a visual depiction... not intended for interstate distribution, or for any
economic or commercial use." United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir.
2003). Only a month before rendering the Raich opinion, the Ninth Circuit
overturned a conviction for possession of a homemade machinegun based on a like
rationale. United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We cannot
agree that simple possession of machineguns-particularly possession of homemade
machineguns-has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.").
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risk. In addition to the drug laws such as the CSA,29 there are several
categories of commerce power-enabled federal laws that purport to

reach possession, including stolen goods crimes,3 ° child pornography

laws,3 1 numerous firearm and ammunition possession laws,32 and other

criminal and civil regulations of various types.33
Beyond the immediate realm of possession laws, the federalism
debates-in which cases like Raich v. Ashcroft3 4 are deeply
immersed-are politically charged, in part, because of anxiety about

the erosion of federal plenary power under the Commerce Clause
generally.35 For example, the civil rights era decisions upholding
legislation prohibiting private racial discrimination in places of public
accommodation explicitly depended on a very broad reading of the
commerce power. 36 Further invalidation of federal laws based on a
lack of substantial effects on interstate commerce or the absence of
economic activity, even when animated by drug law reform, may be
seen as beginning to cast a slim shadow over justifications for
commerce-enabled civil rights laws.37

On February 25, 2004, the Ninth Circuit issued an order denying the
Justice Department's request for an en banc rehearing of its decision
in Raich.38 Following the denial for rehearing, the Justice Department

petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari on April 20, 2004. 39
The issues at stake and the political alignments of the Justices of the

Supreme Court combine to create an expectation that it will reverse
29. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000).
30. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (2000) (current codification of the National
Stolen Property Act of 1948).
31. E.g., id. § 2252A.
32. E.g., id. § 922(g)(1) (criminalizing gun possession by convicted felons); id. §
9220) (criminalizing possession of stolen guns); id. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000)
(criminalizing gun possession in a school zone); id. § 929(a)(1) (regulating possession
of armor-piercing ammunition).
33. See, e.g., id. § 842 (regulating explosive materials); 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 347
(regulating possession and noncommercial provision of colored margarine).
34. 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
35. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
37. E.g., Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(c) (2000);
see Johnson, supra note 24, at 1556 (noting both the usefulness and the dangers of
federal plenary power). "Expanded federal power has yielded the benefits and
protections of the civil rights era.
But the foundation of that power is a
constitutionalism that unbridles collective power and thus invites majoritarian
abuses." Id.; see also infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
38. See Dean E. Murphy, Court Allows Medicinal Use of Marijuana,N.Y. Times,
Feb. 27, 2004, at A22 ("The Bush administration had asked the court... to hold a
new hearing on [the] ruling, issued by a three-judge panel in December .... But in an
order issued Wednesday [Feb. 25th] and made public on Thursday [Feb. 26th], the
court denied the request.").
39. See Ashcroft v. Raich, No. 03-1454 (U.S. filed Apr. 20, 2004), at
http://supremecourtus.gov/docket/03-1454.htm. The Court's response is due by May
20, 2004.
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Raich or a like case.4 However, beyond a skeptical prediction of a
purely result-driven decision, it is not abundantly clear how the Court
can square announced doctrine with federal regulation of mere
possession. a

Federal power to regulate mere possession is often justified under
the modern substantial effects doctrine, which authorizes Congress to
regulate activities that substantially influence interstate commerce.42

The nexus required is between the target of the regulation and its
actual effect on, or propensity to substantially affect, interstate
commerce. 3 As the Ninth Circuit indicated in Raich,4 the post-Lopez
economic character criteria for activities substantially affecting
interstate commerce would seem to exclude noncommercial
possession from the scope of the commerce power.4 "
Justifications for commerce-enabled possession regulations are also

based on theories that they are enacted to protect the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.46 Numerous federal statutes
rely on interstate boundary crossings of one form or another to justify
them as permissible exercises of power. 47 For example, Congress was
able to cure the constitutional infirmities of the legislation at issue in
40. See, e.g., Carol M. Ostrom, Appeals Court Upholds Medical Marijuana Use;
9th Circuit Sides with States that Have Laws Allowing It, Seattle Times, Dec. 17, 2003,
at B1 ("The 9th Circuit has a reputation for being frequently overturned by the
Supreme Court."); Josh Richman, Feds Ordered to Halt Pot Raids; Appellate Judges
Rule Case Fightingfor Medical MarijuanaHas Merit, Oakland Tribune, Dec. 17, 2003
("Boston University Law Professor Randy Barnett, who argued the case to the [Ninth
Circuit] called [the decision]... proof 'that federalism is not just a doctrine for
political conservatives."'), availableat 2003 WL 67865442, at *1-*2.
41. Mere possession, in this context, refers to noncommercial possession or use of
articles unaccompanied by evidence of receipt from interstate commerce or any intent
to distribute commercially.
42. See infra Part II.B.
43. See infra Part I.B.
44. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
45. Id. at 1229 ("The cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal
purposes and not for exchange or distribution is not properly characterized as
commercial or economic activity.").
46. See infra Parts II.A., II.C.
47. Examples include the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2322 (2000) (prohibiting
interstate transport of stolen property); the Lindbergh Law, id. §§ 1201-1204 (making
kidnapping a federal offense when the victim was transported interstate); the
National Stolen Property Act of 1948, id. 33 2314-2315; the Fugitive Felon Act, id. §§
1071-1074; and more recently, the federal carjacking statute which proscribes using
force or violence to steal a vehicle "that has been transported, shipped, or received in
interstate ... commerce." See id. § 2119. Other statutes base jurisdiction on the
interstate transmission of prohibited communications, including the transmission of
illegal gambling information, id. § 1084, and of extortionate communications or
demands for ransom, id. § 875. Certain other formulations do not depend on direct
boundary crossings, but instead appeal to congressional power to regulate
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. The federal criminal prohibition on the use
of a telephone or other "instrument of commerce" to make a bomb threat, even if
used intrastate, has been upheld as a valid exercise of the commerce power. See
United States v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 152 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 844(e)).
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Lopez, and essentially reenact it, with a few simple words. Congress
amended the Gun-Free School Zones Act in 1996 to restrict the

application of criminal penalties to cases in which the government
could prove that the firearm possessed in a school zone had, at any
time, previously traveled in interstate commerce.48 Given modern
economic realities, this amended version operates nearly identically to
the original.4 9

Despite Lopez and the Court's overt attempts to curb the reach of
federal power," the federal government ostensibly maintains the
power to criminalize gun possession by anyone in a school zone5 or by
a convicted felon anywhere,52 where such gun at any time previous to
the possession had moved in interstate or foreign commerce.

Congress also has the constitutional authority to criminalize
possession by anyone, in a school zone or anywhere else, of stolen
guns that had at anytime been "shipped or transported in interstate or

foreign commerce. 53 As elements of the crimes in these examples,
phrases such as "shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce" are usually referred to as "jurisdictional nexus
requirements"5 4 or "jurisdictional element[s]." 55 The jurisdictional
element of a statute56 is that which purports to provide the basis for

authority to enact it.

48. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 657, 110 Stat. 3009-369 (1996) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A)).
49. Federal prosecutors need only demonstrate that the gun originated outside of
the state, or even if manufactured locally, had crossed a state line at any time. See
United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 205 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[W]e conclude that the
proof in this case that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce, at some time in
the past, was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce element .. ");see also
Scarborough v. United States 431 U.S. 563 (1977). Like most modern manufacturing,
gun production is a centralized process and consolidation in the industry has reduced
the number of sources.
Likewise, sophisticated distribution and warehousing
practices often result in pre-sale interstate movement of goods produced and
ultimately sold even in the same jurisdiction. Consequently, the statute will likely
apply even in one of the few states that produce firearms, because guns or at least
their components, like most commodities, will have traveled interstate at one time or
another.
50. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).
52. See id. § 922(g)(1); see also Scarborough,431 U.S. at 563.
53. United States v. Luna, 165 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding 18 U.S.C. §
9220)) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1126 (1999).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 1009 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that
"Lopez illustrated how a jurisdictional nexus requirement could save a statute from
Constitutional infirmity," while qualifying that a "jurisdictional nexus requirement
does not ipso facto validate a statute against an as-applied Commerce Clause
challenge, but its existence is reassuring against a facial challenge").
55. See, e.g., Diane McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and FederalismAfter Lopez
and Morrisor The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-ElementLoophole, 90 Cal. L.
Rev. 1675 (2002).
56. See, e.g., L.B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors'
Discretion, 13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 64, 79 (1948) ("[T]he use of a particular
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Statutory jurisdictional elements used to justify federal enactments
providing for criminal or civil penalties for the mere possession of
articles having once traveled in interstate commerce-or for a
particularized use of such an article-are of a questionable
constitutional pedigree. 7 Such justifications have been variously
referred to as loopholes 5 and legal fictions.5 9

As the Ninth Circuit noted, "[n]o such jurisdictional hook exists in
relevant portions of the CSA" that would "limit the reach of the

statute to a discrete set of cases."'6 Nonetheless, since the marijuana

possessed, at issue in Raich, was found to be homegrown,6 1 the

addition of a jurisdictional element requiring proof that the marijuana
had previously traveled interstate would be immaterial to the outcome

of an as-applied challenge.
If the Supreme Court hears Raich or a similar case, it would seem

that the current majority would either have to strain to articulate how
noncommercial mere possession is an economic activity or invalidate
certain classes of commerce power-enabled possession regulations.
Alternatively, perhaps the Court will suggest that a range of
applications of the CSA could be saved by the inclusion of a

jurisdictional element requiring proof that the marijuana, or perhaps
even seeds, soil, growing lights, or other items attendant to local

cultivation, were introduced into the state from without.
However, this speculation is the result of confining the analysis to
the Commerce Clause doctrine and the result of confusion regarding

the bases of federal authority to regulate mere possession. In this
context, this Note argues that congressional power to regulate
possession is based on the effects of possession on the enforcement
jurisdictional circumstance in the definition of a federal crime only very crudely
marks off the area in which ... [federal jurisdiction is justified].").
57. See infra Part II.B.
58. See McGimsey, supra note 55, at 1682 ("To understand the significance of the
Court's failure in Lopez and Morrison to close the jurisdictional-element loophole, it
is necessary to consider the importance of federalism in the United States.").
59. See United States v. Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("[We]
analyze post-Lopez Supreme Court cases to determine the vitality of continued
application of the interstate transport legal fiction to possession cases like Coward's.
We conclude that the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Morrison and Jones
strongly suggest that this legal fiction no longer deserves any vitality .... "), rev'd, 296
F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 2002) ("'[P]roof. .. that the gun had traveled in interstate
commerce, at some time in the past, was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce
element of the statute'), remanded to No. CRIM 00-88, 2002 WL 31012793 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 2002). Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend a principled federalism that
acknowledges the conclusory presumption that the mere possession or use of goods or
the behaviors of persons who had previously traveled in interstate commerce remain
so engaged, or that the subsequent use or possession of such commodities are
economic in nature, and thereby regulable by Congress if they have substantial effects
on interstate commerce.
60. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations
omitted).
61. Id. at 1225.
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efficacy of valid predicate regulations, usually of the channels of
interstate commerce, of things in commerce. The required nexus,
under this formulation, is not that between the regulated activity and
its effects on commerce, but rather between the activity and its
relation to the efficacy of enforcing or administering valid regulations
of receipt of articles from, or the transport of articles in, interstate
commerce.
If the Supreme Court, at least partially, locates authority for laws
regulating noncommercial possession in relation to the enforcement
of related legislation, rather than in the broad substantial effects
doctrine or in an overwrought notion of transport regulation, it will
not have to choose between abandoning the Lopez economic
activities criteria or invalidating a number of federal schemes
regulating noncommercial possession. The test for statutes purporting
to authorize the regulation of possession or of a particularized
intrastate use of an article should not be centered on whether the
activity genuinely affects commerce, but rather whether it is
genuinely-or at least rationally-tailored
to enhance the
enforcement efficacy of a valid predicate legislative regime.
This Note demonstrates that the prevailing treatments of relevant
possession laws are confused-often tactically-and suggests that a
principled justification for federal regulation of noncommercial
possession, more consistent with traditional jurisprudence than are
most current renditions, is available, and that the doctrine will
acknowledge the centrality of enforcement efficacy. To provide
background, Part I offers a brief review of constitutional federalism
and sketches the major developments in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
Part II traces the origins of the regulation of
possession pursuant to the Commerce Clause and highlights a
fundamental gap in the doctrine.6 2 Part III introduces a preferred
reading of the foundational cases most often cited to defend relevant
possession regulations and offers a conceptual architecture for
understanding and testing the bases for federal authority to regulate
mere possession.
Whatever the merits of the rationale initiated by the Court in
Lopez, the economic activities requirement represents a particular
choice in the current majority's attempt to strike a balance between
the local and the national. An appropriate assessment of possession
regulations, based on their relation to the enforceability of predicate
legislation, is necessary to clarify the conditions for a similar choice.
In the context of mere possession, ultimately and perhaps artificially,
the jurisprudence will have to explicitly distinguish between
regulations of activities that affect commerce and the regulation of
activities that affect the enforcement efficacy of valid enactments.
62. See infra notes 196-97, 294-96 and accompanying text.

2552

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Informed by this framework, the courts may depart from the dubious
jurisdictional elements that rely solely on federal authority to regulate
the possession or the intrastate use of items that had once crossed an
interstate boundary, such as the language of the amended Gun-Free
School Zones Act,63 without jeopardizing all federal possession
regulation. Such a dialogue will increasingly emerge from judicial
treatments of possession regulations and should be of chief concern if

the Supreme Court hears Raich v. Ashcroft.'
I. FEDERALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCE CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE

Spirited by the ideals of eighteenth century political discourse,

and-not incidentally-motivated

to insulate their interests as

propertied elite from feared majoritarian "excesses,"65 the Framers

tempered democracy with certain counter-majoritarian measures.
Constitutional federalism, as such, divides power between the states
and federal government by enumerating federal powers and reserving
the balance "to the States respectively, or to the people."'

The

conventional wisdom is that the Framers dispersed power among the
three branches of the federal government and divided power between
the states and the federal government to curb the concentration of
power and thereby protect freedom.67
Federalism also protects a degree of local autonomy and the values
attributed to it. These values include "promoting responsive and
participatory government by bringing the government closer to the

people[,] fostering diversity and experimentation by increasing the
fora for expressing policy choices and creating a competition for a
mobile citizenry[,] [in addition to] providing a check against tyranny
by diffusing power that would otherwise be concentrated."68
Although not undisputed,69 the Framers understood that the

judiciary would play the central role in defending individual rights as

63. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000).
64. 352 F.3d at 1222.
65. See generally Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American
Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (1990) (providing a
reminder that the fear of popular redistributive legislation animated many
constitutional provisions).
66. U.S. Const. amend. X.
67. See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers,
and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 507 (1988). While true, the shape of
federalism is as much the result of compromise between political actors endowed with
existing institutional power as it is the realization of the ideals of any political theory.
68. Barron, supra note 23, at 378.
69. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, But when Exactly Was Judicially-Enforced
Federalism "Born" in the First Place?, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 123 (1998); Gordon
S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made
More out of Less, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 787 (1999).
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well as in sustaining the federalist structure.7" Judicial review is the

power of the courts to invalidate a congressional enactment.7' In the
range of its exercise, judicial review can additionally be understood as
the measure of relative deference that the courts have shown to

legislative judgments.72

When engaging claims that legislation

intrudes into a recognized individual right, deference to the legislature
can be quite low and the inquiry into the challenged congressional

judgment is more searching than may be expected of the inquiry into
the bounds of enumerated powers. 73 Even when engaging a claim of
intrusion into a protected right, the degree of deference may depend
on the right claimed to have been infringed.7 4
70. See Daniel A. Farber, JudicialReview and Its Alternatives: An American Tale,
38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 415, 423 (2003). Alexander Hamilton identified the role of
the judiciary in maintaining a government of limited powers:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in
a limited constitution. By a limited constitution I understand one which
contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority ....
Limitations... can be preserved in practice no other way than through the
medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void.
The Federalist No. 78, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001). On sustaining federalism, Madison observed that in
"controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the
tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general
government." Id. 39, at 198 (James Madison).
71. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Judicial review itself has
long been criticized for being undemocratic or "anti-populist." See generally William
G. Ross, A Muted Fury: Populists, Progressives, and Labor Unions Confront the
Courts, 1890-1937 (1994). There are those who call for its elimination. See, e.g., Mark
Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999); Jeremy Waldron,
Law and Disagreement (1999). Judicial review of congressional enactments may
certainly be "anti-populist" and undemocratic. Or, judicial review may be seen as
necessary to protect democracy from legislation that impairs democratic function.
For more on judicial review and democracy, see Curtis, supra note 24, at 321 ("But if
the people are so degenerate that they reject our most basic national values, it is
'wildly unlikely' that courts can save 'us' from 'ourselves' [anyway]." (quoting
Tushnet, supra)). If undemocratic laws are passed "at least... the people have 'made
their own mistake' rather than having one foisted on them by unelected and
unaccountable judges." Id. at 322 (presenting Waldron's response, quoting Waldron,
supra, at 293-94). Judicial review is perhaps undemocratic if the transitory will of "the
people"-if the unlikely result of some deliberation and more perfectly identified
with elected officials-is somehow better reflected in a piece of legislation than in the
values that have been given constitutional expression. Nevertheless, the preferred
function of judicial review is to check congressional power in fidelity to constitutional
design.
72. See generally Killenbeck, supra note 21.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
("There may be narrower scope... of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.").
74. See David. L. Hudson, Jr., Circuits Split Over Prisoners' Religious Rights, 2
No. 45 ABA J. E-Report 2, at *1-*3 (2003). Hudson discusses the conflict among the
circuits in the degree of deference shown to generally applicable legislation that
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When marking the bounds of the enumerated powers, the courts
have considered congressional determinations even about the
authority to exercise the particular power in a given manner, with
varying degrees of deference. In the realm of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, the degree of deference shown to congressional
judgments has ranged from nearly total, 75 to qualified, 76 and at times
to virtually nonexistent.77
Although conflicts between federal legislation and state powers
have arisen in a range of contexts,78 federal laws enacted pursuant to
the enforcement powers of the Civil War Amendments,7 9 under the
Spending Clause, 0 and under the Commerce Clause,8 1 have drawn the
bulk of the doctrine-shaping federalism challenges. Because most of
the expansion of the federal government has been enabled by the
judicially sanctioned growth of the commerce power, the story of
federalism often overlaps with the story of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence."2

impacts religious practices that has developed since Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), wherein
the Court held that such legislation need only be reasonably related to its object, and
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), wherein the Court invalidated an
attempt by Congress to force the courts to return to a strict scrutiny test as applied
against state laws via the Fourteenth Amendment.
75. Congressional enactments will be upheld "if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis." FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). Congress did not have to supply the
rational basis, or exhibit consciousness of one in particular. "[W]e never require a
legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for
constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason... actually motivated the
legislature." Id. at 315 (citing United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179
(1980)). "Judicial review under [this] test is tantamount to no review at all." Id. at 323
n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995) ("[T]o the extent
that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that
the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no
such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.").
77. See, e.g., United Sates v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) ("Congress' [sic]
findings are substantially weakened by the fact that they rely so heavily on a method
of reasoning that we have.., rejected.").
78. See, e.g., United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)
(striking a state's attempt to impose term limits on federal senators and
representatives); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) (upholding a treaty provision
at the expense of state statutes); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816) (affirming constitutional authority for Supreme Court review of state court
decisions).
79. U.S. Const. amends. XIII, § 2, XIV, § 5, XV, § 2.
80. Id. art. I, § 8, cl.1.
81. Id. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
82. See, e.g., Anthony B. Ching, Traveling Down the Unsteady Path: United States
v. Lopez, New York v. United States, and the Tenth Amendment, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
99, 103 (1995) ("Since much of the early expansion of the national government's
powers dealt with the Commerce Clause, which delegated to the national government
broad power to regulate commerce among the several states, the evolution of
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A. Defining InterstateCommerce
In 1824, Gibbons v. Ogden presented a challenge to a New York
law approving a monopoly over steamboat navigation between New
Jersey and New York, brought by an operator excluded by the
monopoly, yet duly licensed by the laws of the United States to
navigate its waters.8 3 The parties offered competing conceptions of
commerce: The defenders of the monopoly asserted that commerce
was limited "to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of
commodities"; their rivals in the lucrative market insisted that
commerce necessarily included navigation.'
When invalidating the New York monopoly, the Court refused to
accept the narrow view of commerce and concluded that "[t]he power
of Congress... comprehends navigation within the limits of every
State... so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected
with [interstate commerce]." 85 The Court found that the Constitution
authorized the federal regulation of the navigable waterways, as literal
channels of interstate commerce.86
Nearly fifty years later, in The Daniel Ball, a Michigan steamboat
operator challenged federal regulation on the ground that the routes
of his operation were wholly internal to the territory of the state.87
The Court held that such a steamer was indeed subject to federal
regulation because she carried goods destined for other states and
received goods from other states and thereby "was employed as an
instrument of [interstate] commerce. '' ss A factual inquiry revealed
that the steamboat was directly engaged as an instrument of interstate
commerce, that interstate commerce penetrated into the interiors of
states and operated through the use of a combination of
instrumentalities, and that some instrumentalities of interstate
commerce crossed state lines and some, like the steamboat Daniel
Ball, did not. 9
Over the following years, the Court struggled with challenges to the
application of the Sherman Act9" to certain trusts91 and in determining
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is, in many ways, the evolution of Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence.").
83. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 2 (1824).
84. Id. at 189-90.
85. Id. at 197.
86. See id.
87. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565 (1870).
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209-10 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7,
15 (2000)).
91. Compare United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895) (holding that
processing and selling sugar is not interstate commerce), with Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905) (holding that processing and selling beef is
interstate commerce).
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transport

of

commodities or persons.9 2 After a fact-based inquiry, the processing
and sale of beef products was held to constitute interstate commerce,93

yet the processing and sale of sugar was categorically determined not

to be interstate commerce.94 Legislative prohibitions on the use of the

channels of interstate commerce of lottery tickets95 and of women for

the purpose of prostitution 96 were upheld -notwithstanding their
demonstrably noncommercial, moral purpose-while regulations on
the manufacture of goods produced for eventual use in those channels
were invalidated.9 7

The cases from this period, which upheld federal prohibitions on
participation in interstate commerce by certain commodities or
persons, were based on congressional authority to protect the

channels of interstate commerce from undesirable uses. As more
activities were undertaken specifically in order to participate in
interstate commerce, the reality of the reach of interstate commerce
grew faster than the judicial cognizance of its occasions.
This circumstance and the difficulties it produced eventually led the
Court to retreat to a factually dubious, reductive formalism which
established per se categories of activities unregulable pursuant to the
commerce power. By 1921, mining, manufacture, and agriculture had
been designated as beyond Congress's authority to regulate.9 8 Despite

the fact that production for interstate commerce represented a
burgeoning sector of all production, the Court defended the formal

distinction between production and commerce until 1937. 99
92. Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272, 276-77 (1918) (invalidating
federal prohibition on interstate shipment of furniture manufactured by child labor
within thirty days of manufacture), with Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323
(1913) (upholding federal prohibition on interstate transport of women for
prostitution), and Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 58 (1911)
(upholding provisions of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906), and Lottery Case, 188
U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903) (upholding federal law prohibiting lottery tickets from the
channels of interstate commerce).
93. See Swift, 196 U.S. at 398-99.
94. See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 13.
95. See Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 363-64.
96. See Hoke, 227 U.S. at 323.
97. See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272, 276-77.
98. See, e.g., Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 257 (1921) ("It is settled...
that the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce does not reach whatever
is essential thereto. Without agriculture, manufacturing, mining, etc., commerce
could not exist, but this fact does not suffice to subject them to the control of
Congress.").
99. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating portions of the
Coal Conservation Act). The Court reasoned:
We have seen that the word 'commerce' is the equivalent of the phrase
'intercourse for the purposes of trade.' Plainly, the incidents leading up to
and culminating in the mining of coal do not constitute such intercourse.
The employment of men, the fixing of their wages, hours of labor, and
working conditions, the bargaining in respect of these things-whether
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B. Reaching SubstantialEffects-ProducingActivities
In the years leading up to 1937, the Court struck down, on

federalism grounds, several important portions of President Franklin
D. Roosevelt's New Deal legislation and was under political and
popular pressure to get on board with the economic recovery agenda;
Roosevelt even threatened to pack the Court with a majority of
sympathetic justices. 100

Before NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel

Corp.,"°' the Court had employed descriptive definitions of commerce,
even though functional attributes of particular activities were

sometimes cited as evidence to support the descriptive definition. 10 2
In
Jones
&
Laughlin, the
Court
abandoned
the
production/commerce distinction and upheld the National Labor

Relations Act 113 ("NLRA") as applied to the regulation of labor
relations in steel manufacturing." The Court held that, "[a]lthough
activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if
they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce

that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce
from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power

to exercise that control."''

5

The Court acknowledged congressional

carried on separately or collectively-each and all constitute intercourse for
the purposes of production, not of trade.
Id. at 303.
100. See Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 169 (1960).
Roosevelt was elected in 1936 by a large majority. Id. at 168.
101. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
102. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905); The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1870); cf A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 544 (1935).
[I]n dealing with common carriers engaged in both interstate and intrastate
commerce, the dominant authority of Congress necessarily embraces the
right to control their intrastate operations in all matters having such a close
and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or
appropriate to secure the freedom of that traffic from interference or unjust
discrimination and to promote the efficiency of the interstate service.
Id.
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-170 (2000).
104. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 41.
[T]he fact remains that the stoppage of those operations by industrial strife
would have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce. In view of
respondent's far-flung activities, it is idle to say that the effect would be
indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would be immediate and might be
catastrophic. We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our
national life and to deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an
intellectual vacuum. Because there may be but indirect and remote effects
upon interstate commerce in connection with a host of local enterprises
throughout the country, it does not follow that other industrial activities do
not have such a close and intimate relation to interstate commerce as to
make the presence of industrial strife a matter of the most urgent national
concern.
Id.
105. Id. at 37 (citing Schechter, 295 U.S. at 546-47).
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power to legislate activities based on how they functioned in relation
to interstate commerce, in addition to the traditional power to
regulate interstate commerce directly. Comparing the application of
06
the NLRA to the steel industry with that of the Railway Labor Act'
to the Virginian Railway Company, 10 7 the Court inquired: "And of
what avail is it to protect the facility of transportation, if interstate
commerce is throttled with respect to the commodities to be
transported!"'0 8 For the first time, the commerce power reached preshipment conditions of manufacture and the production/commerce
distinction dissolved.
Shortly thereafter, the Court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart'0 9 in
United States v. Darby,"0 when it upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938"1 ("FLSA") -which required companies engaged in the
production of goods for interstate commerce to establish wage and
hours requirements and provided for the denial of the use of the
channels of interstate commerce for those goods manufactured in
violation of the FLSA. The Darby opinion emphasized that it was
irrelevant whether Congress was motivated to protect interstate
commerce, or whether Congress used its power to instead regulate
working conditions, "[w]hatever their motive and purpose, regulations
of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition
are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the
Commerce Clause.""' 2

The Court maintained a clear distinction

between the enforcement provision of the enactment and the validity
of the application of the wage and hours standards on the lumber
manufacturer.
The opinion grounded the provision excluding
shipment of proscribed goods on congressional power over the use of
channels, and applied emerging substantial effects principles to
uphold the wage and hours standards.' 3
The doctrine was further extended in Wickard v. Filburn,"4 wherein
the Court held that Congress could regulate the consumption of
homegrown wheat by a single farmer because, if aggregated through
repetition elsewhere, it "would have a substantial effect in defeating
and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased
prices."''5 Yet, on its own, the activity would not produce significant
effects on interstate commerce. After Wickard, Congress could
106. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (2000).
107. See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
108. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 42.
109. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). For some discussion of Hammer, see supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
110. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
111. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
112. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115.
113. See infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
114. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
115. Id. at 129.
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essentially regulate anything that, if sufficiently aggregated, would be

deemed to affect interstate commerce, along with any of
its
16
instrumentalities and anything traveling in interstate commerce."
The growth of national regulation during this period was indeed

dramatic.'17 The expansion of the national government heralded by

the New Deal has been attributed, in part, to progressive
constitutional theory that "required that the Commerce Clause be
interpreted

as a constitutional

transmitter

letting the national

government regulate whatever the American people deem[ed] to be a
national problem.""' 8 More likely, the role of the judiciary seems to
have been somewhere between the measured recognition of a
sophisticated and increasingly interconnected economic reality and a
recognition of an increasingly hostile political one." 9
Given this background, it is not surprising that the Court relied on
the commerce power to uphold Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964' 2 -as against private establishments of public accommodationafter it was immediately tested by a declaratory judgment action
brought by a motel operator intent on continuing racial discrimination
in letting rooms, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 121 and
by an action to enjoin the application of the Act on a small, familyowned restaurant, in Katzenbach v. McClung.2 2 The Court upheld
the Act as applied to Ollie's Barbecue, a local restaurant serving and
employing local people, because it was found to have received a
substantial enough portion of the food that it served from out of state
suppliers to bring it under federal regulation.1 23 To be subject to the
116. See, e.g., Badawi, supra note 24, at 1343.
117. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 24, at 203 ("[The substantial effects doctrine]
occurred, of course, during a period of generally expanding national regulatory
authority at the expense of the states.").
118. Eric E. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive
Political Theory and the Commerce Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 11 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 403, 403 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
119. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the New
Deal political climate on the court).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(c) (2000).
121. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress based the Act on §
5 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as
its power to regulate interstate commerce .... Congress possessed ample
power [pursuant to the Commerce Clause], and we have therefore not
considered the other grounds relied upon. This is not to say that the
remaining authority upon which it acted was not adequate, a question upon
which we do not pass, but merely that since the commerce power is sufficient
for our decision here we have considered it alone.
Id. at 249-50.
122. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
123. Id. at 301 (aggregating the effects of similarly situated restaurants and noting
"as our late Brother Jackson said for the Court in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942): 'That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by
itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as
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Act, it need not be proven that a vendor's sale of food had any effect
on interstate commerce; Congress had previously legislated a
presumption that if a substantial portion of the food served was
supplied from out of state, the124 requisite substantial effects on
interstate commerce were present.
Similarly, the Court, in Perez v. United States,'125 accepted
Congress's legislated conclusion that loan sharking, per se, had direct
and substantial effects on interstate commerce, as expressed in Title II
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968.126 The Court affirmed
Perez's conviction under the Act against a Commerce Clause
challenge. 127 Here, the Court accepted Congress's conclusion that, as
a general matter, such transactions "are carried on to a substantial
extent in interstate and foreign commerce" and "[e]ven where
extortionate credit transactions are purely intrastate in character, they
nevertheless directly affect interstate and foreign commerce.' ' 8 Since
Congress included such intrastate activities in a class of activities
having previously been determined to affect interstate or foreign
commerce, the government needed only to prove that Perez engaged
in such transactions, without regard to proof of any particular effects
on interstate or foreign commerce.1 29 The Court summarized the state
of the doctrine:
The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of
problems. First, the use of channels of interstate or foreign
commerce which Congress deems are being misused, as, for
example, the shipment of stolen goods or of persons who have been
kidnaped [sic]. Second, protection of the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, as, for example, the destruction of an aircraft,
or persons or things in commerce, as, for example, thefts from
interstate shipments. Third, those activities affecting commerce. 3 '
Given the doctrinal acrobatics displayed by the Court since the New
Deal to shepherd federal plenary power, it is not surprising that many
serious observers considered it settled that the only limit on
Congress's commerce power was its own self-restraint.'
From the
1936 decision in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.'32 until after Alfonso Lopez,
Jr. walked onto to a school zone with a pistol nearly six decades

here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is
far from trivial"' (citation omitted)).
124. See id.
125. 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971).
126. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (2000).
127. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 146-47.
128. Id. at 147 n.1.
129. Id. at 154-55.
130. Id. at 150 (citations omitted).
131. See, e.g., Rotunda, supranote 24, at 800.
132. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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later,'33 the Court did not invoke Commerce
Clause limitations to
34
invalidate a single congressional enactment.1

C. The New Commerce Clause: Qualifying SubstantialEffectsProducingActivities

Lopez was convicted for violating a provision of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990,135 wherein "Congress made it a federal
offense 'for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place
that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
school zone."" 3 6 The Fifth Circuit reversed and "held that, in light of

what it characterized as insufficient congressional findings and
legislative history, [the statute], in the full reach of its terms, is invalid37

as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.'
The Fifth Circuit was concerned that Congress did not even pay lip

service 13to a plausible commerce justification in the language of the

statute.

1

In affirming the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court, in a five-four
decision, held that the target of the legislation-the activity of
possession of a firearm in a school zone-did not substantially affect
interstate commerce and therefore was beyond Congress's reach
under the Commerce Clause.139 Because the statute did not contain

an express jurisdictional element restricting its application to cases
involving guns proven to have had previously traveled interstate, the

Court foreclosed the possibility that the statute was enacted pursuant
to congressional power to regulate the use of the channels of

interstate commerce, to regulate a "thing" in interstate commerce, or
to protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce.
133. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
134. See Seinfeld, supra note 24, at 1263 ("From the 1936 decision in Carter Coal
until the Lopez decision in 1995, the Court did not deem a single act of Congress
invalid on Commerce Clause grounds.").
135. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844-45 (1990) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000)).
136. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
137. Id. at 552 (internal quotations omitted).
138. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1360 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e would
note that the source of constitutional authority to enact the legislation is not manifest
on the face of the bill." (quoting testimony of officials from the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms)).
139. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
140. See id. at 559.
[Section] 922(q) is not a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate
commerce, nor is it an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a
commodity through the channels of commerce; nor can [§] 922(q) be
justified as a regulation by which Congress has sought to protect an
instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing in interstate commerce.
Thus, if [§] 922(q) is to be sustained, it must be under the third category as a
regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
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The government argued that the aggregate impact of the regulated
activity-gun possession in and around schools-had substantial
effects on interstate commerce because it adversely affected the
education of the citizenry and, in turn, unfavorably impacted national
productivity.14 As the circuit court had noted, the statute did not
contain congressional findings correlating the regulated activity with
the asserted harm on national productivity, representing a legislative
judgment to which the Court may have deferred. 42 Nonetheless, it is
doubtful that any such findings would have saved the statute,
"[a]lthough as part of our independent evaluation of constitutionality
under the Commerce Clause we of course consider legislative
findings ...Congress normally is not required to make formal findings
as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
commerce." 143 The post-1937 Court's deference to congressional
findings, especially regarding congressional determinations regarding
the limits of Congress's own power, was giving way to the Lopez
majority's "independent evaluation" of constitutionality.'"
In a departure from previous decisions, the Court established a new
requirement for determining whether activities substantially affect
interstate commerce. The Court limited those activities that may be
deemed to have substantial effects on interstate commerce to those
involving commercial transactions; the enactment "cannot, therefore,
be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that
arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which
viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce."' 4 5
The Court reiterated that "[t]he possession of a gun in a local school
zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition
elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. 146
This qualification incorporated an economic activities threshold into
the substantial effects test. 47
In United States v. Morrison,48 the majority invalidated the civil
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 199414
141. Id. at 563 ("The Government argues that possession of a firearm in a school
zone may result in violent crime and that violent crime can be expected to affect the
functioning of the national economy ....).
142. Id. at 562 ("[T]he Government concedes that '[n]either the statute nor its
legislative history contain express congressional findings regarding the effects upon
interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone."').
143. Id. (citations omitted); see United Sates v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000)
("Congress' [sic] findings are substantially weakened by the fact that they rely so
heavily on a method of reasoning that we have ... rejected .....
144. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
145. Id. at 561.
146. Id. at 567.
147. See id.
148. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
149. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1941 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
13981 (2000)).
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because "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense
of the phrase, economic activity."' 50 The Court took the opportunity
to articulate the state of the doctrine:
As we observed in Lopez, modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence
has identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under its commerce power. First, Congress may regulate
the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is
empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.
Finally, Congress' [sic] commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce 151
i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate

commerce.

Essentially, the elements are identical to those earlier recapped by the
Court in Perez,'5 2 except that Rehnquist, writing again for a bare
majority, more accurately could have rendered the last sentence as
"Congress's commerce authority includes the power to regulate those
intrastate activities, economic in nature, having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce." '53
In another important development, and a marked departure from
Heart of Atlanta, McClung, and Perez, the majority in Morrison
emphasized that it would independently review the purported
connection between the targeted activity and interstate commerce.'54
The Court asserted that, although the civil remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act
in Lopez, was supported by numerous congressional findings
regarding the serious impact of gender-motivated violence on victims
and their families, these "findings are substantially weakened by the
fact that they rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that [this Court
has] already rejected."' 55 Whereas the Court had previously deferred
to congressional determinations of the existence of substantial effects
of a class of activities on interstate commerce-if they were evident in
the enactment or legislative history-the Morrison majority reminded
Congress that "'[w]hether particular operations affect interstate
commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of
Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a

150. 529 U.S. at 613.
151. 529 U.S. at 608-09 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
152. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
153. For original language, see supra note 151 and accompanying text; Morrison,
529 U.S. at 609.
154. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
155. Id. at 615.
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legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.

1

56

While the Lopez opinion had asserted the independence of the Court
in determining the scope of the commerce power, leaving open the
possibility

of

accepting

relevant

congressional

findings,157

the

Morrison decision strongly asserted158the exclusivity of the judiciary in
such constitutional determinations.
II. THE ORIGINS

OF COMMERCE-ENABLED POSSESSION
REGULATIONS

The antecedents of federal regulations of the possession or use of

articles that had previously

been "in commerce

or affecting

commerce"' 159 are those enactments which directly regulated interstate
shipment and transport and contained traditional jurisdictional
elements. 160 Traditional jurisdictional elements are those statutory
invocations of the commerce power used to condition access or to

deny access to the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, for use by particular goods or by persons for particular
purposes. The first formulations of jurisdictional elements depended

on congressional control of interstate shipping or transport across
state lines.

Congress rendered versions that were calculated to

regulate participants, and the conditions of participation, in interstate
commerce and interstate travel. Such regulatory schemes were
upheld by the Supreme Court and included: 1) the outright denial of

use of the channels of interstate commerce for moving undesirable
articles; 6 ' 2) the denial of use by persons for identified undesirable
purposes; 162 3) the qualified denial of use for noncompliant
participants,' 63 and finally; 4) the maintenance of compliance for

156. Id. at 614 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
273 (1964)).
157. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
158. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614; supra note 156 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1202(a), 82 Stat. 236 (1968) ("Any person
who... has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any
political subdivision thereof of a felony ... and who receives, possesses, or transports
in commerce or affecting commerce ... any firearm shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.").
160. See, e.g., The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, 21 U.S.C. § 14 (repealed 1938)
(upheld in Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911)) (current version at
21 U.S.C. §§ 352-397 (2000)); see also supra note 92.
161. See Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903) (upholding federal law
prohibiting lottery tickets from the channels of interstate commerce); see also supra
note 92 and accompanying text.
162. See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (upholding federal
criminal prohibition on interstate transport of women for prostitution); see also supra
note 92 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941); see also supra notes
110-13 and accompanying text.

2004]

RETHINKING POSSESSION

2565

qualified use throughout the full extent of the length of the channels
of interstate commerce. 164
A. Invoking Commerce Power: The TraditionalFormulations
There is a long history of congressional attempts to prohibit certain
items from interstate commerce by denying them the use of the
channels of interstate commerce or by denying them the use of legal
instrumentalities flowing through the channels. For example, in the
Lottery Case, the Supreme Court held that the power to regulate
interstate commerce included the power to prohibit the traffic of
The Court upheld
articles through channels of interstate commerce.'
the denial of the use of the channels by lottery tickets, not because the
traffic in lottery tickets affected interstate commerce, but because it
was interstate commerce: "We are of opinion that lottery tickets are
subjects of traffic and therefore are subjects of commerce, and the
regulation of the carriage of such tickets from State to State ... is a
regulation of commerce among the several States."' 166
This power to prohibit was further refined to allow for federal
criminal prohibitions on the transportation of articles or people for
particular uses. For example, in Caminetti v. United States,'67 the
Court upheld a conviction, against a Commerce Clause challenge, for
a violation of the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910,168 which
"specifically made an offense to knowingly transport or cause to be
transported, etc., in interstate commerce, any woman or girl for the
purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for 'any other immoral
purpose."'169 Importantly, the requisite mental state required intent to
transport for a particular purpose. Therefore, the transport was
The mental state of
criminal if the intent to "debauch" motivated it.
70
Congress, however, was not terribly important.
Congress unsuccessfully attempted to enact particularized
prohibitions of articles that were sensitive to the conditions of their
production. Sustaining the formal production/commerce distinction,
the Court invalidated an enactment that prohibited the interstate
7
shipment of the products of child labor in Hammer v. Dagenhart.11
164. See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696-98 (1948).
165. Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 363-64; see also supra note 92 and accompanying
text.
166. Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 354.
167. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000).
169. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485.
170. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913) ("[T]he facility of
interstate transportation can be taken away from the demoralization of lotteries, the
debasement of obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the
impurity of food and drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the systematic
.
enticement to and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of women ..
171. 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918).
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There, the Court found that the legislation was pretextual for direct
regulation of the conditions of production and therefore
impermissible. 72 This would be one of the last times that the Court
found congressional intent dispositive of an otherwise valid direct
exercise of commerce power. The now famous dissent of Justice
Holmes predicted the direction of the Court:
It does not matter whether the supposed evil precedes or follows the
transportation. It is enough that in the opinion of Congress the
transportation encourages the evil. I may add that in the cases on
the so-called White Slave Act it was established that the means
adopted by Congress as convenient to the exercise of its power
might have the character of police regulations?73
174
In United States v. Darby,
the Court, in addition to upholding the
validity of the wage and hour requirements of the FLSA, addressed its
enforcement mechanism: the prohibition of the interstate shipment of
goods manufactured under conditions contrary to the FLSA. 7 5 The
Court followed the substantial effects rationale underlying NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'76 in order to uphold the wage and hour
requirements.1 77 The Court also expressly overruled Hammer v.
Dagenhart178 and found no cause to resort to a consideration of
substantial effects with regard to the enforcement provision. "While
manufacture is not of itself interstate commerce, the shipment of
manufactured goods interstate is such commerce and the prohibition
of such shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation of the
commerce." 179 The Court's approval of the enforcement provision at
issue in Darby sent a clear message to Congress that its motivation for
restricting the use of the channels of interstate commerce was
irrelevant, and that it could so condition participation in the national
economy on whatever it deemed desirable. 8
After the Court
foreclosed inquiry into permissible legislative motives, the focus

172. Id. at 271-72 ("The act in its effect does not regulate transportation among the
States, but aims to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining
and manufacturing within the States.").
173. Id. at 279-80 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

174. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
175. Id. at 125-26.
176. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
177. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118 ("[Congress's commerce power] extends to those
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power
of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce.").
178. Id. at 116-17 ("The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart...
should be and now is overruled.").
179. Id. at 113.
180. Id. at 116 ("The thesis of the opinion that the motive of the prohibition or its
effect to control in some measure the use or production within the states of the article
thus excluded from the commerce can operate to deprive the regulation of its
constitutional authority has long since ceased to have force.").
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largely shifted to questions concerning the definition of activities
constituting participation in interstate commerce.
In 1943, the Supreme Court, in Tot v. United States, 8 ' considered a
provision of the Federal Firearms Act.182 In pertinent part, the statute
declared:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a
crime of violence or is a fugitive from justice to receive any firearm
or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate
or foreign commerce, and the possession of a firearm or ammunition
by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm
or ammunition was shipped or transported or received, as the case
may be, by such person in violation of this Act.
The government and the lower court agreed that the statute did not
attempt to reach mere possession." It rather criminalized the receipt
or transport of firearms and ammunition and legislated a presumption
that possession constituted requisite evidence of previous receipt or
transport. 8 1 Moreover, the criminal receipt of the article had to have
a direct connection with interstate transport: "[T]he Act is confined
to the receipt of firearms or ammunition as a part of interstate
transportation and does not extend to the receipt, in an intrastate
transaction, of such articles which, at some prior time, have been
'
transported interstate."186
This was a forthright acknowledgment that
direct congressional authority over things in interstate commerce was
limited to the extent of interstate commerce.
The Court held the presumption invalid as an evidentiary matter,
"the mere possession of a pistol coupled with conviction of a prior
crime is no evidence at all that the possessor of the pistol has acquired
it in interstate commerce.' 1 87 Importantly, the statute contained no
reference to the substantial effects of possession on interstate
commerce.
181. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
182. Pub. L. No. 785, ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250-51 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 902(f)
(repealed 1968)) (current version, the presumption from possession rule omitted, at
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d), 923(f) (2000)).

183. Id.
184. See Tot, 319 U.S. at 466.
Both courts below held that the offense created by the Act is confined to the
receipt of firearms or ammunition as a part of interstate transportation and
does not extend to the receipt, in an intrastate transaction, of such articles
which, at some prior time, have been transported interstate.
The
Government agrees that this construction is correct.
Id.
185. Id. ("[The issue is] the question of the power of Congress to create the
presumption... that, from the prisoner's prior conviction of a crime of violence and
his present possession of a firearm or ammunition, it shall be presumed that the
article was received by him in interstate or foreign commerce.").
186. Id.
187. Id. at 473 (Black, J., concurring).
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United States v. Sullivan188 is seen as a foundational decision
extending federal regulatory power into subsequent intrastate
commerce of goods that had first been introduced into the state from
without.'89 Sullivan, a pharmacist, was convicted of violating a
provision of the Pure Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938190
because he transferred medicine from duly branded containers into
unlabeled containers (except by name) before holding them for sale in
his pharmacy. 91
The statute provided for criminal penalties for misbranding drugs
while "held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce."'92
Answering Sullivan's defense that congressional commerce power was
limited to the regulation of the conditions of the first sale following
importation into the destination state, the Court held that Congress
intended to and had the power to "broadly and unqualifiedly prohibit
misbranding articles held for sale after shipment in interstate
commerce, without regard to how long after the shipment the
misbranding occurred, how many intrastate sales had intervened, or
193
who had received the articles at the end of the interstate shipment.'
Under Sullivan, interstate commerce grasped the post-import sales
and re-sales of commodities introduced through interstate commerce
without regard to whether the subsequent intrastate activity had
effects on the national economy. 194
The Court identified the issue before it: "[T]he question relates to
the constitutional power of Congress under the commerce clause to
regulate the branding of articles that have completed an interstate
shipment and are being held for future sales in purely local or
intrastate commerce."' 95 Although decided in 1948, the opinion
contains no discussion of the substantial effects of Sullivan's
misbranding of medicine containers for local sale.
Most commentators trace the advent of the problematic modern
jurisdictional elements, those that purport to reach possession, to the
decision in Sullivan, attributing it to a failure by the Court:
to define how explicit the nexus between the line crossing and the
regulated activity must be, open[ing] the door for more expansive
interpretations of what Congress could regulate under the channels
and instrumentalities rationales ....Congress eventually began to
regulate activity based not on a close connection between a line
188. 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
189. See, e.g., McGimsey, supra note 55, at 1698-99.
190. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000).
191. Sullivan, 332 U.S. at 691-92.
192. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(k).
193. Sullivan, 332 U.S. at 696. "Congress [has the power] under the commerce
clause to regulate the branding of articles that have completed an interstate shipment
and are being held for future sales in purely local or intrastate commerce." Id. at 698.
194. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
195. Sullivan, 332 U.S. at 698.
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crossing and the regulated activity, but on the
196 fact that a person or
good had, at some point, crossed state lines.
It is presumed that because the Court upheld regulations on the postshipment condition of the drugs that Congress, without more, was
thereafter able to reach post-sale possession and the conditions of use
of articles of interstate commerce.197
B. The Leap Forward: The Height of Deference and the Substantial
Effects of Possession
After the substantial effects principles became increasingly settled,
Congress began to add that judicially created basis of authority to the
traditional statutory jurisdictional elements. In 1971, the Court heard
United States v. Bass.198 Bass was convicted of possessing firearms in
violation of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968.199 The statute provided that "[a]ny person who.., has
been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any
political subdivision

thereof of a felony ...

and who receives,

possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce.., any
firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not
The Act contained the
more than two years, or both."2 °
indiscriminate language "in commerce or affecting commerce" that
Congress increasingly began adding to constitutionally marginal
enactments.2 0'
The government contended that the statute prohibited possession
per se, and consequently:
There was no allegation in the indictment and no attempt by the
prosecution to show that either firearm had been possessed "in
commerce or affecting commerce." The government proceeded on
the assumption that [the statute] banned all possessions and receipts
of firearms by convicted felons, and that no connection with
interstate commerce had to be demonstrated in individual cases.2"2
The Court, instead, construed the "in or affecting commerce"
language to refer to receiving, transport, and possession, and held that
the "conviction must be set aside because the Government has failed
to show the requisite nexus [between possession and] interstate
commerce." 2 3 Importantly, the Court emphasized: "In light of our
disposition of the case, we do not reach the question whether, upon
196. McGimsey, supra note 55, at 1699.

197. See id.
198. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
199. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 1201-1203, 82 Stat. 236-37 (1968); Bass, 404 U.S. at 337.

200. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1202(a) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104 (b), 100
Stat. 459 (May 19, 1986)).
201. Id.
202. Bass, 404 U.S. at 338.
203. Id. at 347.
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appropriate findings, Congress can constitutionally punish the 'mere
possession' of firearms. ' ' 2° The Court disposed of the case without
sanctioning, nor foreclosing, federal regulation of possession based on
the commerce power." 5
Unlike the food sold at Ollie's in McClung,2 °6 the misbranded
medicine peddled in Sullivan,20 7 and the prohibition on receipt of guns
and ammunition directly from interstate transport at issue in Tot v.
United States, 2 s the opinion of the Court in Scarborough v. United
States2 9 tacitly approved a federal statute criminalizing the mere
possession of a firearm that at anytime had been transported in or
affected interstate commerce, by anyone convicted of a felony under
federal, state, or local law. 210 The decision was based primarily on an
exploration of legislative intent for purposes of statutory
interpretation and did not extensively consider the constitutionality of
the statute. To establish a nexus with interstate commerce, the
government needed only to prove that the firearm possessed by the
convicted felon traveled at some time in interstate commerce.2
Scarborough had lawfully obtained his firearms and subsequently
pled guilty to a Virginia drug trafficking charge.2 2 The federal law, at
the instant of his guilty plea, rendered his possession criminal.2 3
Unlike the de facto national ban on lottery tickets endorsed by the
Court in the Lottery Case,214 this penalty was not targeted at denying
the use of the channels of interstate commerce by a particular article,
but at the possession of the commodity by a discrete class of
individuals.
To the extent that the constitutional authority for the statute was
addressed by the Scarborough Court, it is clear that the Justices
accepted congressional findings, much as they did in Perez,215 on the
effects of gun possession by felons on interstate commerce. The
204. Id. at 339 n.4.
205. See id. at 347-51.
206. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
209. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
210. Id. at 577-78.
211. Id. at 568.
212. Id. at 564.
213. Id. at 565 ("As a matter of fact, he contended that by the time of his
conviction he no longer possessed the firearms. His claim was that, to avoid violating
this statute, he had transferred these guns to his wife prior to pleading guilty to the
narcotics felony."). The Court did not bite. Id. Justice Stewart, in dissent, argued that
the statute, Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
could and therefore should be read to apply to only the possession of firearms, by
felons, after their conviction and after given reasonable opportunity to dispose of the
firearms. Id. at 578-80 (Stewart, J. dissenting). Notably, Justice Rehnquist "took no
part in the consideration or decision" of the case. Id. at 578.
214. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
215. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
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Court accepted the congressional declaration that "the receipt,
possession, or transportation of a firearm by felons ...constitutes...
a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of
commerce." 216 In uncritically accepting that substantial effects
existed, the Court importantly maintained the difference between
sources of authority under the Commerce Clause: "Congress is aware
of the distinction between legislation limited to activities 'in
commerce' and an assertion of its full Commerce Clause power so as
to cover all activity substantially affecting interstate commerce. "217
The Scarborough decision did not explicitly develop the doctrine to
bridge the gap between the regulation of post-import, pre-final sale
conditions of articles, such as those at issue in Sullivan,21s and the
regulation of intrastate mere possession, but instead matter-of-factly
deferred to a conclusory congressional determination that the
Commerce Clause authorized such regulation.1 9 The authority for
the possession regulation was found exclusively in an expansive,
deferential version of substantial effects theory. 22°
C. CultivatingConfusion: The New Commerce Clause and Mere
Possession
Prior to Lopez, activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce were measured by their effects on commerce, not explicitly
by the commercial nature of the activities themselves. 2 1 The Court
held, in Wickard, that if
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this
irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier
time have been defined as "direct" or "indirect.", 2
The fundamental shift in Lopez is the examination of the nature of
the source of the perceived harm to interstate commerce as some sort
of shortcut to determining whether the source actually affects
interstate commerce sufficiently to subject it to congressional
regulation. 22 3 An underlying principle on which the Court depended
in upholding the New Deal and the civil rights legislation is that
216. Scarborough,431 U.S. at 571 n.10.
217. Id. at 571 (quoting United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271
(1975)).
218. See supra notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
219. See Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 575 ("[W]e see no indication that Congress
intended to require any more than the minimal nexus that the firearm have [sic] been,
at some time, in interstate commerce.").
220. See id.
221. See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
222. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
223. See supra Part I.C.
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federal power "may be exerted to protect interstate commerce 'no
matter what the source of the dangers which threaten [interstate
commerce],' ' 22 4 so long as such sources are found to have substantial
effects on it.
In this way, the Lopez test, as incorporated into substantial effects
doctrine, harkens back to the earlier cases wherein the commercial
nature of a particular activity was cited as evidence that it constituted
interstate commerce. The opinion of Justice Holmes, for a unanimous
Court, in Swift & Co. v. United States, is exemplary:
[C]ommerce among the States is not a technical legal conception,
but a practical one, drawn from the course of business. When cattle
are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation that
they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and when in
effect they do so, with only the interruption necessary to find a
purchaser at the stock yards, and when this is a typical, constantly
recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of commerce
among the States, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and
incident of such commerce. 2'
A factual inquiry into the nature of particular transactions, as in Swift,
is appropriate to determine whether such transactions are interstate
commerce, but less helpful in assessing whether local activities that
demonstrably are not interstate commerce nonetheless affect it.
Nevertheless, the Lopez majority designated the economic nature of
an interstate commerce-affecting activity as evidence that its effects
are substantial.
The substantial effects doctrine was developed in response to the
realities of a sophisticated, interconnected economy wherein
intrastate activities, in and of themselves commercial or otherwise,
could easily frustrate desirable national regulation of interstate and
foreign commerce. The facts in Wickard226 demonstrate the necessity
of regulating ostensibly noncommercial intrastate activity in order to
effectively regulate interstate commerce. The dissenters from the
Lopez majority explained:
In [Wickard], this Court sustained the application of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 to wheat that Filburn grew and consumed
on his own local farm because, considered in its totality, (1)
homegrown wheat may be "induced by rising prices" to "flow into
the market and check price increases," and (2) even if it never
actually enters the market, homegrown wheat nonetheless "supplies
a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected

224. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (citing Mondou
v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1912))).
225. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905).
226. 317 U.S. at 111.
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by purchases in the open market" and, in that sense, "competes with
wheat in commerce."
In order to take the Lopez opinion seriously, one would have to
determine whether the intrastate consumption of homegrown
products is "economic activity"-as a threshold question-before one
could consider its effects on interstate commerce. On one hand, if
consumption of homegrown wheat is somehow "economic activity," it
may be regulated if it substantially affects interstate commerce.
Alternatively, if consuming homegrown products is deemed not to
constitute economic activity, the inquiry is over and the activity
unregulable.228
This indeterminacy was further illustrated by the dissenters again,
this time in Morrison.229 They wondered: "[I]f chemical emanations
through indirect environmental change cause identical, severe
commercial harm outside a State, why should it matter whether local
factories or home fireplaces release them? ' 230 Under the Lopez
commercial activities requirement, direct regulation of private
fireplaces is beyond congressional authority because their use is not
sufficiently economic in nature.
It is doubtful that the majority announced the economic activities
rule in denial of the effects that noncommercial activities could have
on interstate commerce. Rather, by limiting the consideration of the
substantial effects of an activity on interstate commerce to activity
that is itself somehow discernibly, qualitatively economic, the doctrine
attempts to find the appropriate balance between the local and the
national. Perhaps the majority could have reached the same result by
an alternate rationale. 23 1 Nonetheless, the Court instructs that only
commercial, economic activities have the capacity to affect the
national economy sufficiently to warrant federal regulation.232
Furthermore, since reaffirming that it would not necessarily defer to
congressional findings on an activity's substantial effects on
commerce, in Morrison,233 the current Court could hardly be expected
to accept a legislated presumption that mere possession affects
227. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 627 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128).
228. See supra Part I.C.
229. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
230. Id. at 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
231. See, e.g., Badawi, supra note 24, at 1355-74 (suggesting that centralized
regulation, and therefore the substantial effects principles, should embrace activities
that are prone to spillovers (e.g., pollution) and be employed to prevent holdouts
(e.g., one state withholding acceptance of programs requiring uniformity in order to
extract disproportionate value, increasing costs to all), without regard to their
"commercial" nature); Seinfeld, supra note 24, at 1301-28 (suggesting that the Court
employ a purpose-based analysis to discourage pretextual legislating).
232. See supra Part I.C.
233. 529 U.S. at 598; see supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
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Court
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in

2 34 Having made these choices, if the current majority
Scarborough.

were to acknowledge that possession-enabling jurisdictional elements
were dependent on a theory that possession substantially affected
interstate commerce, they consequently would have to apply the

economic activities threshold to invalidate a category of regulations of
noncommercial mere possession.

Jurisdictional elements are written into many statutes and often
include references to both interstate boundary crossings and
substantial effects theories.23 5 When the Lopez majority addressed

the absence of a jurisdictional nexus requirement in the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, they did not distinguish between "in-commerce"

and "affecting commerce" authority: The statute "has no express
jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of
firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with
or effect on interstate commerce. '236 The dicta implied that if the Act
was amended to restrict its application to cases wherein the
government proved that the firearm previously traveled in interstate
commerce, then it would be saved from facial invalidation. Congress
so amended the Gun-Free School Zones Act in 1996.237
After Lopez and Morrison, since the Court reiterated that it would

independently determine substantially affecting causes, congressional
findings supporting a theory of substantial effects and written into
statutes, while perhaps helpful to the Court, 238 did not insulate them
from as-applied challenges. 239 The Court demonstrated this soon after
deciding Morrison, in Jones v. United States.240
In Jones, the Supreme Court considered an as-applied challenge to
a federal enactment providing criminal penalties for arson.241 The
statute made it a federal crime "to damage or destroy, 'by means of
fire or an explosive, any ... property used in interstate or foreign
commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign
234. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 571 n.10 (1977); see supra notes
209-20 and accompanying text.
235. The Hobbs Act provides criminal penalties for "obstruct[ing], delay[ing], or
affect[ing] commerce ... by robbery or extortion," 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000). The
credit card fraud statute criminalizes the use of a stolen credit card in a transaction
affecting commerce, 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (2000), and the RICO statute proscribes a range
of activities defined as either engaged in or affecting commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
236. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
237. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).
238. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 ("While 'Congress normally is not required to
make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
commerce,' the existence of such findings may 'enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affect[s] interstate commerce, even
though no such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked eye."' (alterations in
original) (citations omitted)).
239. See supra note 54.
240. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
241. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
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commerce."' 242 The Court unanimously vacated Jones's conviction
because the house he burnt down, as an owner-occupied residential
dwelling, was not, at the time of the arson, used in interstate
commerce 243
or for activities producing substantial effects on interstate
commerce.

The Court held that, in order for real property-and thereby the
activity of burning it down-to be embraced by federal Commerce
Clause power, it must, at the time of the arson, be currently used in
interstate commerce or currently used in such a way affecting
interstate commerce:
"We hold that the provision covers only
property currently used in commerce or in an activity affecting
commerce." 244 The statute, as applied to the facts, especially after
Lopez and Morrison, was invalid; the use of a private noncommercial
dwelling, by its terms, is not economic activity and therefore does not
substantially affect interstate commerce.2 45
The jurisdictional element in the federal arson statute does not
invoke any direct regulatory authority of the use of the channels of
interstate commerce, or of things or persons traveling in interstate
commerce. Despite the language of the statute, real property cannot
be "in" interstate commerce or cross state lines. Yet, real property
certainly can be used to substantially affect interstate commerce, and
this type of jurisdictional element is simply a codification of the
substantial effects rules, an additional element to be proven by the
prosecution.
The substantial effects doctrine only embraces intrastate activities
that affect commerce. 246 But the Court's recitation of the statute's
conflation "used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce, '"247
retains the confusion initiated in the Lopez dicta. Congress wrote the
jurisdictional element as a catch-all to invoke all of the sources of
congressional authority previously developed by the courts.
The Third Circuit considered the validity of the felon-in-possession
jurisdictional element after Lopez, Morrison and Jones in United
States v. Singletary.248 The court reexamined the question previously
at issue in Scarborough:249 whether or not congressional commerce
power extended to possession, by a convicted felon, of a gun that had
previously traveled in interstate commerce.
The felon-in-possession statute,25' considered in Singletary, contains
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Jones, 529 U.S. at 850 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)).
Id. at 856-59.
Id. at 859.
Id.
See supra Part I.B.
Jones, 529 U.S. at 859.
268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 976 (2002).
431 U.S. 563 (1977).
See Singletary, 268 F.3d at 196.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000).
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common jurisdictional element language: "It shall be unlawful for [a
felon] ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to
252
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been [so] shipped.
The statute contains two separate prohibitions with distinguishable
sources of authority: 1) the prohibition on shipment and receipt based
on Congress's power to regulate the channels of commerce, things "in
commerce"; and 2) the prohibition of commerce-affecting mere
possession based on a substantial effects theory authorized by
Scarborough. 3
Singletary's possession qualified as mere possession in that no proof
was offered that he shipped the firearm in or received it directly from
interstate commerce: "[T]he gun in question was manufactured in
Brazil, imported into the United States through Atlanta, Georgia, and
eventually sent to a firearms dealer in Texas in 1973 .... The
Government presented no evidence regarding when the gun had come
'
into Pennsylvania."254
Clearly, congressional authority to regulate
Singletary's mere possession could only be based on the effects that it
may have on interstate commerce, yet "the Government presented no
evidence concerning
any effect the gun had on interstate
2 55
commerce."
If the court were to acknowledge that possession regulation derived
from substantial effects rules, it would have had to apply the postLopez economic activities requirement. Instead, as applied to a
jurisdictional element-dependant possession law, the Third Circuit
chose to confuse the analysis by partially locating the source of
congressional power in traditional "in commerce" justifications. The
court observed that the enactment "by its very terms, only regulates
those weapons affecting interstate commerce by being the subject of
interstate trade... [i]t addresses items sent in interstate commerce
and the channels of commerce themselves, delineating that the latter
be kept clear of firearms. '25 6 Somehow the regulation of mere
possession was lifted from its foundation in a congressional
presumption of substantial effects-which was questionable in the
first instance-and re-formulated in order to uphold the statute as
applied, based on congressional authority to protect the use of
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
The Third Circuit's treatment of the issue exemplifies the confusion
resulting from the failure to distinguish between substantial effects
doctrine and Congress's traditional power to directly regulate the
252. Id. § 922(g).
253. See supra Part II.B.
254. Singletary,268 F.3d at 198.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 204 (concluding that "an analysis of the kind utilized in Lopez or
Morrison is neither appropriate nor needed").
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channels of, and things in, interstate commerce. The Third Circuit
recognized that Lopez identified potential jurisdictional elements with
both substantial effects and with direct regulation, and then went on
to employ the principle of direct regulation of the use of channels in
order to find a way to follow Scarborough,5 7 which was wholly
dependent on a casual acceptance of a congressional determination of
substantial effects. Simply because a gun, as opposed to the house at
issue in Jones, can actually be shipped "in commerce" does not
transform all of the possible incidences of its regulation into "in
commerce" shipment regulations.
Furthermore, since Morrison
foreclosed the option, the Court could not uphold the application of
the statute based on a congressional finding that the class of
activities-the possession-per se affects commerce sufficiently to
warrant federal regulation.2 8
The Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal from the Third
Circuit's decision in Singletary. 9 In denying certiorari, the Court
sustained confusion in analyses of jurisdictional elements purporting
to authorize possession regulations-confusion between the limits 2of60
regulatory power and the limits on the incidences of its operation.
The failure to clearly identify mere possession regulations as
professed exercises of authority to regulate substantial effectproducing activities, by suggesting that they in part derive from direct
"in commerce" regulatory power, obscures the otherwise obvious
contradiction between the current formulation of substantial effects
and justifications for possession-based federal regulation.2 6 '
The
257. See id.
Missing from Singletary's analysis, however, is the recognition that, while
Lopez and Morrison were questions concerning the power of Congress to
regulate activities substantially affecting interstate commerce, [§] 922(g)(1)
regulates the possession of goods moved in interstate commerce. The
jurisdictional element in [§] 922(g)(1) distinguishes it from the statutes
considered in Lopez and Morrison.
Id.
258. See supra Part I.C.
259. 535 U.S. 976 (2002).
260. In 1851, Justice Curtis provided a rendition:
In construing [the Constitution], and in determining the extent of one of its
important grants of power to legislate, we can make no such distinction
between the nature of the power and the nature of the subject on which that
power was intended practically to operate, nor consider the grant more
extensive by affirming of the power, what is not true of its subject.
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 320 (1851).
261. Traditional regulations of the channels of interstate commerce are
inapplicable to the regulation of mere possession, as are all interstate transportdependent regulations. Arguably, the outside boundary of the permissible regulation
of possession to protect the channels of commerce is marked by a requirement that
the possession be shown an incident of interstate traffic. That is to say, mere
possession is not sufficient to give rise to federal regulation of transport. In order for
the commerce power itself to reach possession, it must be coupled with proof of
receipt from interstate commerce or proof of intent to distribute interstate. The fact
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confusion is perhaps tactical; there are both political and public policy

concerns implicated in the contemplation of calling into question, if
not invalidating, a broad category of federal laws of possession.262
If the Supreme Court hears Raich v. Ashcroft,263 it may become
more difficult to sustain this confusion because the CSA does not
contain an express jurisdictional element of the type relied on by the
Third Circuit in Singletary.26
Like Lopez, Raich requires a
straightforward consideration of the effects of the possession on

interstate commerce. If the Supreme Court agrees with the Ninth
Circuit and characterizes the particular possession of marijuana as
"intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession, ' ' 26 it can be
expected to apply the substantial effects test as developed in Lopez
2 66
and Morrison.
If the Court suggests that the statute could be saved
by the addition of a jurisdictional element that limits prosecutions to

cases of mere possession that "affect commerce," it will be forced to
articulate why noncommercial possession should warrant exception
from the economic activities qualifier.
III. THE CASE FOR PREDICATE LEGISLATION-ENFORCEMENT
EFFICACY RATIONALE

Congress has used jurisdictional elements in statutes to justify
possession regulations by purporting to limit their application to items
or people, or activities dealing with items that had been "in or
affecting commerce." '67
The courts have required that the

government demonstrate that the item in question had in fact traveled

interstate.2" The 1996 amendment to the Gun-Free School Zones Act
demonstrates how Congress can employ jurisdictional elements to

save an enactment from facial unconstitutionality while retaining the
operative force of the original legislation.269

that articles may have at one time previous to the possession traveled in interstate
commerce neither establishes a per se conclusion that the possession affects interstate
commerce, nor is it evidence that the articles retain a sufficient relationship with the
channels of commerce to claim the regulation as a piece of transport legislation. The
addition of a jurisdictional element requiring proof that an article previously traveled
interstate should not be sufficient to somehow transform the regulation of mere
possession into a transport regulation.
262. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
263. 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
264. See id. at 1231 ("No such jurisdictional hook exists in relevant portions of the
CSA.").
265. Id. at 1228.
266. See supra Part I.C.
267. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text (discussing the federal arson
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000)).
268. See, e.g., United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 205 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[W]e
conclude that the proof in this case that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce,
at some time in the past, was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce
element ... ").
269. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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Judicial explanations of the source of power behind such
enactments have been unclear. Some decisions have articulated
congressional authority in terms of a conclusion that such items by
definition have substantial effects on interstate commerce. Others
have located the authority in congressional power over the channels
of interstate commerce, presumably because of some residual
connection that adheres to the items even after they cease to be
articles of trade. The current decisions conflate and interchange these
two theories, thereby retaining the expansive reach of the substantial
effects rationale while excepting its application to possession laws
from the
more stringent economic activities analysis announced in
270
Lopez.
Possession laws that do not contain express jurisdictional elements,
but are rather justified by generalized findings of substantial effects,
such as the CSA at issue in Raich,27 1 confront the economic activities
analysis head-on.27 2
In either case, the professed source of
constitutional authority for the regulations is the commerce power.27 3
The CSA criminalizes possession of certain drugs except as
authorized by the statute. 274 Federal authority to enact the possession
element of the CSA is based on a theory that "[local distribution and
possession of controlled substances contribute to swelling the
interstate traffic in such substances,' 275 as well as on findings that
"controlled substances distributed locally usually have been
transported in interstate commerce immediately before their
distribution, ' 276 and that "controlled substances possessed commonly
flow through interstate commerce immediately prior to such
possession. ' 277 Here, Congress attempted to codify a presumption
that certain objects have the attributes of articles of interstate
commerce and that they somehow consequently substantially affect
interstate commerce.
As repeated in every relevant case, the commerce power is
generally described as reaching the regulation of the channels of
interstate commerce, and things or persons in it, the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, and those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.2 78 Congressional authority to regulate this field
270. See supra notes 248-62 and accompanying text (discussing Singletary, 268 F.3d
at 196).
271. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000).
272. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003) ("As applied to the
limited class of activities presented by this case, the CSA does not regulate commerce
or any sort of economic enterprise.").
273. See, e.g., id. at 1227 ("Congress passed the CSA based on its authority under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution."); Singletary, 268 F.3d at 205.
274. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a).
275. Id. § 801(4).
276. Id. § 801(3)(b).
277. Id. § 801(3)(c).
278. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000).
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of objects, people, and behaviors is usually attributed to the
Commerce Clause directly, but substantial effects rationales also seem
to be derived in part from an under-appreciated combination of
commerce power and power granted by the Necessary and Proper
Clause.279
A reevaluation of the line of cases, however, suggests that federal
regulation of noncommercial mere possession has its origin in a power
even more closely allied with the Necessary and Proper Clause. The
Court, in Darby, explained of Congress's power:
It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end, and the exercise of the ganted power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce [directly].
The Court designated two types of "effects": those activities affecting
commerce 28and
those activities affecting the exercise of power over
1
commerce.
Congress certainly has the power to enact legislation that is
"necessary and proper" to the effective execution of one of its
enumerated powers. 282 Most first year law students learn Chief Justice
Marshall's famous line from M'Culloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional., 283 When approaching the possession
cases with this distinction in mind it becomes clear that the source of
power authorizing the laws is located in an enforcement efficacy
rationale.
A. Re-Reading the Commerce Clause Possession Cases
Scarborough v. United States stands as the key Supreme Court
decision upholding federal regulation of mere possession based on a
jurisdictional element invoking the post-1937 substantial effects
279. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see Seinfeld, supra note 24, at 1290-91 (citing
Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking ConstitutionalFederalism,74 Tex. L. Rev. 795, 807-11
(1996)). "As Professor Gardbaum points out, the role played by the Necessary and
Proper Clause in the evolution of Commerce Clause doctrine has been underappreciated." Id.
280. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (echoing and citing
Marshall's famous line from M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420
(1819)).
281. See id.
282. See Seinfeld, supra note 24, at 1292-97 (discussing the possibility of employing
a pretext analysis to Commerce Clause review, derived from jurisprudential traditions
developed in the evaluation of enactments pursuant to the Necessary and Proper
Clause).
283. 17 U.S. at 420.
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rationale.284 The Court, in its opinion, was preoccupied with statutory
interpretation to resolve a temporal sequence question, 285 and did not
vigorously examine the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession
statute. Moreover, the Court un-judiciously accepted a congressional
declaration of the substantial effects of felons-in-possession on the
national economy:
While Congress' choice of tenses is not very revealing, its findings
and its inclusion of the phrase "affecting commerce" are somewhat
more helpful. In the findings at the beginning of Title VII, Congress
expressly declared that "the receipt, possession, or transportation of
a firearm by felons.., constitutes.., a burden on commerce or
threat affecting the free flow of commerce." 6
Aside from this case and the subsequent cases straining to follow
it,287 the Court's treatment of federal regulation of possession, by way
of jurisdictional elements, is better understood in terms of the effects
of possession on the ability of federal authorities to enforce predicate
regulations on the shipment, transport, or receipt of articles in or from
interstate commerce.
In 1943, in one of its first considerations of the question, the Court,
in Tot v. United States, reviewed a statute that was explicitly targeted
at the receipt of guns and ammunition, by a certain class of felons or
by fugitives, from interstate commerce. 288 The Court considered and
then rejected a congressional presumption that possession constituted
requisite evidence of such receipt: "[The issue is] the question of the
power of Congress to create the presumption... that, from the
prisoner's prior conviction of a crime of violence and his present
possession of a firearm or ammunition, it shall be presumed... that
the article was received by him in interstate or foreign commerce. "289
Congress's obvious concern was with the ability to enforce its
prohibition on such persons' participation in the interstate commerce
of guns and ammunition.
It is difficult to prove the conditions of receipt after the fact.
Congress addressed this practical problem by declaring that
possession was per se evidence of receipt of the articles from
284. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); see supra Part II.B.
285. See Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 570 ("While it is true that Congress did not
choose the precise language... to indicate that a present nexus with commerce is not
required, neither did it use the language... to indicate that the gun must have a
contemporaneous connection with commerce at the time of the offense.").
286. Id. at 571.
287. See, e.g., United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 976 (2002).
288. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (discussing Pub. L. No. 785, ch. 850,
52 Stat. 1250-51 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (repealed 1968)) (current
version, the presumption from possession rule omitted, at 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d), 923(f)
(2000)).
289. Id. at 466.
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interstate commerce. The Court rejected the presumption, in part,
because possession by way of receipt from interstate commerce was
indistinguishable from possession by other means. 90 The Court
affirmed that congressional commerce power extended over all the
incidences of interstate transport and even receipt therefrom, but did
not reach the regulation of possession where such possession did not
necessarily indicate interstatereceipt.
While not embracing possession, the provision at issue in United
States v. Sullivan was animated by the same efficacy of enforcement
rationale. 9' Sullivan had been convicted of violating the Pure Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act because he broke down duly labeled
packages of drugs into small containers for sale, but failed to retain
the original mandated labels. 92 The underlying legislation was
enacted pursuant to congressional authority to prevent the interstate
shipment of misbranded medications. To sustain the efficacy of the
plan, Congress needed to provide for penalties for altering the
articles.
The Sullivan opinion reached to find the terminus of the channels of
interstate commerce, extending federal power up until the sale of the
articles to the end-user, the consumer.293 It is very difficult to police
such a provision, however, because it requires distinguishing between
intermediary traders and noncommercial mere possessors.
As previously noted, most commentators trace the presumption
that the commerce power reaches possession of articles that had been
introduced through interstate commerce to the Sullivan opinion's94
extension of authority over post-import sales and re-sales.
However, attributing possession laws to the Sullivan rationale fails to
adequately appreciate the distinction between the regulation of the
conditions associated with pre-final sale and the regulation of
conditions of mere possession. This distinction is not so easily
overcome.
Sullivan was a harmful articles protective case, seeking to maintain
the labeling requirements of the Pure Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
until the last sale. That basis for the decision echoes that of the early
cases:29 Duly branded articles are good, misbranded articles are bad,
and Congress wishes to deny the use of the channels of interstate
commerce to bad articles. But, in order to maintain the scheme,
290. Id. ("[T]he Act is confined to the receipt of firearms or ammunition as a part
of interstate transportation and does not extend to the receipt, in an intrastate
transaction, of such articles which, at some prior time, have been transported
interstate." (emphasis added)).
291. 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
292. See id. at 690-91.
293. See id. at 696.
294. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); see also supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
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Congress had to discourage misbranding because, in this case, it was
all too easy to change a good article into a bad one.
Hence, the regulation had to reach a prohibition on a particularized
use of the article, and prohibited behaviors in relation to the article
other than transport itself. Denial of access could not prevent
Sullivan from misbranding drugs since access had already been
granted, but only to duly labeled articles. The decision affirmed that
Congress could regulate to maintain the conditions under which a
regulated article was granted entry into interstate commerce.
Furthermore, Sullivan is a federal anti-tampering case as applied to
retailers who participate directly in interstate commerce. Because the
Act addressed only the conditions of final sale, notably not receipt, it
was a regulation of retailers and commercial participants generally.
Modern regulations of possession can find no direct authority in
Sullivan, except insofar as it began to expand the imagined community
of participants in interstate commerce.
Rather than conditioning access to interstate commerce, for
example by requiring drugs to be properly labeled, the regulations
implicating mere possession go to the enforcement efficacy of one
form of outright denial of access to interstate commerce or another.
The predecessor to the felon-in-possession statute barred felons, not
from possessing, but from transporting guns in, or receiving guns
from, interstate commerce.2 96
Having enacted such a restriction on the use of the channels of
interstate commerce by felons to obtain guns, squarely within its
power, Congress needed to reach the conditions that could render the
legislation unenforceable.
Unless law enforcement personally
witnesses or has direct evidence of the receipt of an article from out of
state, one of the few and most practical means of enforcing the
prohibition is to proscribe possession. Congress attempted to address
the problem by legislating a presumption that possession of a gun by a
felon evinced the felon's receipt of the gun from interstate
commerce.2 97 The Court thwarted this tactic in Tot v. United States.98
Congress responded by drafting the modern felon-in-possession
2 99
statute, at issue in Scarborough,
which purported to hinge federal
authority on a finding that "the receipt, possession, or transportation
of a firearm by felons.., constitutes.., a burden on commerce or
threat affecting the free flow of commerce."3' ° Decided during a
296. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (discussing Pub. L. No. 785, ch.
850, 52 Stat. 1250-51 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (repealed 1968) (current
version, the presumption from possession rule omitted, at 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d), 923(f)
(2000)); supra Part ll.B.
297. See Pub. L. No. 785, ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250-51.
298. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
300. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 571 (1977) (citing Pub. L. No. 90351, § 1201(1), 82 Stat. 236 (1968)).
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period of nearly unlimited deference to congressional determinations,
Scarborough emerged as the sole source of authority for the clumsy
proposition that mere possession affects interstate commerce.0 1
Although the impulse to effectively regulate receipt from interstate
commerce-by regulating possession-is the genuine basis for a class
of possession laws, the rationale has been overrun by the dominance
of substantial effects doctrine in evaluating all commerce-enabled
legislation. As a result, the dialogue of judicial review of possession
laws has been largely confined to "in or affecting commerce" analyses.
In applying the post-Lopez economic activities requirement in
order to cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of the application
of the CSA on intrastate cultivators and consumers of medical
marijuana, the Ninth Circuit, in Raich, had to distinguish the facts
from Wickard v. Filburn.3° Recall that the legislation at issue in
Wickard °3 dealt with wholly intrastate activity: The consumption of
homegrown wheat." The Court determined that such consumption,
if duplicated elsewhere, would substantially affect wheat prices and
therefore interstate commerce. 30 5 The substantial effects doctrine,
fortified by the aggregation principle, enabled congressional
regulatory power to embrace the intrastate, arguably noncommercial,
price-affecting conditions directly.3"
Restrained to the substantial effects analysis, the constitutionality of
such possession laws turns first on the threshold determination of
whether the possession is or is not economic activity, and second, on
an assessment of the extent that it affects interstate commerce.
Dissenting from the Raich opinion, Eighth Circuit Judge Beam, sitting
by designation on the three-judge Ninth Circuit panel,30 7 confessed
that "[ilt is simply impossible to distinguish the relevant conduct
surrounding the cultivation and use of the marijuana crop at issue in
this case from the cultivation and use of the wheat crop that affected
30 8
interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn."
It is far from ideal that
vital federalism values seemingly occupy the space between
homegrown wheat and homegrown pot.
In this context, an enforcement efficacy rationale is more
301. Although it is often cited in conjunction with Scarborough to support the
notion that previous interstate transport of an article is sufficient to give rise to
congressional authority to regulate subsequent possession, the Court did not approve
of the extension of the commerce power over possession in United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336 (1971). See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
302. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1230 (9th Cir. 2003) ("As the regulated
activity in this case is not commercial, Wickard's aggregation analysis is not
applicable." (citation omitted)).
303. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
304. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
307. See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1223.
308. Id. at 1235 (Beam, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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appropriate. Although it is argued here that possession laws owe the
bulk of their constitutional authority to the enforcement efficacy of
interstate transport and receipt regulations, even Wickard remains
instructive. The Court held:
The maintenance by government regulation of a price for wheat
undoubtedly can be accomplished as effectively by sustaining or
increasing the demand as by limiting the supply. The effect of the
statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be produced
for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort
to the market by producing to meet his own needs. That appellee's
own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is
not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation
where, as here, his contribution, taken tOgether with that of many
others similarly situated, is far from trivial.
In contemporary jurisprudence, the Wickard opinion has come to
represent the aggregation principle and a reaffirmation of the Court's
abandonment of the earlier production/commerce distinction. While
the last sentence of this excerpt is oft-quoted, the fact that the
rationale depended on the effects of consumption of homegrown
wheat on a greater regulatory scheme to prop up national wheat
prices, not on a notion that such consumption affected commerce
regardless, is often under-appreciated.
Congressional findings associated with the CSA that "[t]he illegal
importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession and improper
use of controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect
31 certainly
on the health and general welfare of the American people""
appear insufficient to sustain the legislation as applied to mere
possession after Lopez and Morrison.31 ' Because the jurisprudence is
so bound up with substantial effects principles, the government
presumably did not raise, and the Ninth Circuit did not adequately
address, possible enforcement efficacy justifications.3" 2
However, there are findings that explicitly summon an enforcement
efficacy rationale and are more appropriate to an evaluation of the
permissibility of regulating mere possession under the CSA: "Federal
control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled
substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate
incidents of such traffic."3'13 In the first instance, Congress may
outright deny access to the channels of interstate commerce to
controlled substances.
If thereafter possession regulations are
determined to be plainly adapted to substantially enhance the
enforcement efficacy of the interstate transport regime, then such
309. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (citations omitted).

310.
311.
312.
313.

21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (2000).
See supra notes 135-58 and accompanying text.
See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1222.
21 U.S.C. § 801(6).
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possession laws should be upheld. Of course, applying such a test
does not necessitate a particular outcome for cases such as Raich.
There are fact-based determinations at the heart of the enforcement
efficacy question.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Raich depended on distinguishing
between the limited use of marijuana for medical purposes and the
possession attendant thereto, and "the broader illicit drug market," by
finding that the marijuana at issue "is not intended for, nor does it
'
enter, the stream of commerce."314
This conclusion is meant to answer

the government's theory that the appellants' use, by affecting demand
for marijuana, thereby affected the interstate market for it
substantially enough to bring such use under federal authority.315
Because the possession neither proceeded sale nor followed purchase,
medical use of homegrown marijuana was found by the Court to be
"significantly different from the findings relating to the effect of drug
'
trafficking, generally, on interstate commerce."316
The theory seems
to be that the appellants would not be using or possessing marijuana
but for their medical needs, and therefore their possession bears no
relation to the interstate market in illicit drugs, or at least a tooattenuated relation.'
The line between the class of activities at issue
and other uses, such as religious, or even some types of recreational
uses of homegrown marijuana, will be difficult to determine.318
However, this sensitivity to the particularized use of the possessed
article-the reason for possession-is in essence closer to an attempt
to determine the relationship of the possession to the efficacy of
enforcement of prohibitions on participation in interstate commerce.
That is to say, the court did not implicate the absence of or the
insufficiency of a nexus between interstate commerce and the
possession in the first instance, but rather found that the nexus
between illicit drug traffic generally (an acknowledgment of predicate
regulations criminalizing the traffic) and the appellants' possession
was too attenuated. 39 The Court was not explicit in this rhetorical
move and did not contemplate possible sources of congressional
power beyond the substantial effects doctrine.320
Again, articulating an enforcement efficacy rationale will not
314. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228.
315. See id.
316. Id. at 1232.
317. See id. at 1233 ("Presumably, the intrastate cultivation, possession and use of
medical marijuana on the recommendation of a physician could, at the margins, have
an effect on interstate commerce by reducing the demand for marijuana that is
trafficked interstate. It is far from clear that such an effect would be substantial.").
318. If the fatal problem with the application of the CSA to possession of
marijuana for medical use is limited to the fact that such possession is not in any way
economic activity, it would seem equally invalid as applied to a range of factual
circumstances.
319. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
320. See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1222.
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determine the outcome of cases such as Raich. It is merely suggested
that the discourse surrounding determinations of the constitutionality
of federal regulations of possession be informed by considerations of
enforcement efficacy. Theoretically, the Court could maintain certain
current commerce-enabled possession laws while invalidating others,
depending on a principled assessment of enforcement efficacy.
B. Towards Application
When evaluating a statute including a jurisdictional element or one
that purports to regulate possession otherwise, the courts need to first
determine whether or not it is an invocation of judicially created
substantial effects principles, by way of operation if not declared
purpose, such as the jurisdictional element at issue in Jones v. United
States;321 or whether it purports to be an instance of some direct
regulation of interstate shipment and/or receipt, such as the
prohibition at issue in the Lottery Case.322 If an invocation of
substantial effects formulations, the Court may proceed to apply that
doctrine. As it stands currently, this includes the economic activities
qualifier. The Court so applied the doctrine in Jones to invalidate the
federal arson statute as applied.323 If the jurisdictional element is a
regulation of transport and its operation is so limited to prohibitions
on shipment, transmission or receipt, or participation conditions on
interstate shipment or transmission, and therefore incapable of
reaching mere possession, then it ought to be evaluated accordingly.
The confusion arises when the language of the statutory element
includes references to previous shipment or transmission as evidence
of substantial effects.
Jurisdictional element-dependent regulation of possession, such as
the federal gun possession statutes, should only be upheld when
predicate legislation exists that directly regulates the articles in the
channels of interstate commerce, i.e., regulations of interstate
transport and receipt therefrom, and when the operation of the
possession regulation is plainly adapted to enhance the efficacy and
enforceability of the predicate scheme. In approaching jurisdictional
elements, the courts need to untangle evaluations of the direct
exercise of enumerated power, and enactments necessary to its
execution, from modern substantial effects doctrine.
Statutory invocations of the substantial effects rules where the
required nexus is conceived to be between the target of the regulation
and its effects on interstate commerce should be treated no differently
than any other enactment evaluated based on substantial effects. If
the Court continues to apply the economic activity criteria of review,
321. 529 U.S. 848 (2000); see supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
322. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
323. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 856-59.
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congressional utterances of jurisdictional elements including "shipped
in or affecting commerce" language should not magically insulate
enactments from such review. Statutory renditions of substantial
effects rules operate, if nothing else, to telegraph to the courts the
constitutional marginality of the enactment and its susceptibility to asapplied challenges. In short, substantial effects rules should have no
bearing on review of jurisdictional element-dependent laws regulating
mere possession. Of course, they would be applied to determine the
validity of a predicate scheme that depends on the jurisdictional
element-dependent enactment in order to be effectively carried out.
Although there are numerous commerce-enabled possession laws,324
the application of an enforcement efficacy rationale may be illustrated
by reference to three varieties of gun possession laws, if for no other
reason than because they have been frequently tested in the courts.
The fact that they are guns, and the existence of the Second
Amendment, bears no relation to the discussion.
As long as Congress first, or contemporaneously, enacted predicate
legislation prohibiting stolen guns from interstate transport and
prohibiting receipt of stolen guns from interstate transport, regulating
possession of stolen guns would be upheld under the proposed test. It
is well established that Congress has the power to deny access to the
3 25
channels of interstate commerce for whatever reason it wants.
Because Congress can regulate access to interstate commerce and the
conditions of participation through its entirety (recall the Tot and
Sullivan cases 326), it can legislate to prohibit access and prohibit
receipt: "At all events it is established by the Lottery Case and others
that have followed it that a law is not beyond the regulative power of
Congress merely because it prohibits certain transportation out and
out. 3 27 Because of the aforementioned enforcement difficulties in
proving receipt from interstate transport and in distinguishing
between stolen guns that have traveled interstate from other stolen
guns, and the fact that one cannot tell a stolen gun by looking at it, it
would be rational to regulate the possession of stolen guns by anyone,
in order to substantially enhance the enforceability of the predicate
legislation proscribing receipt from, or shipment in, interstate
commerce. As in the misbranded drugs at issue in Sullivan,328 a good
or at least neutral commodity (without getting into the gun-control
debate) is capable of being modified at any time into an undesirable
commodity, by being subject to theft. Therefore, the most rational
324. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
325. See Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 363-64 (upholding, in 1903, a federal law
prohibiting lottery tickets from the channels of interstate commerce).
326. See supra notes 288-96 and accompanying text.
327. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 278 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
328. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
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and cost-effective way to prohibit stolen guns from the channels of
interstate commerce is to regulate possession of stolen guns.
The amended Gun-Free School Zones Act provides a counterexample. There is no valid predicate legislation prohibiting all guns
from interstate commerce. Congress cannot legislate, in the first
instance, to prohibit interstate transport of something that is predicted
to take a particular course, for example to end up in a school zone.
Such a notion depends on an imagined subsequent possession, and is
not, therefore, regulation of interstate transport.
Moreover, if
predicate legislation existed which purported to prohibit all guns from
interstate transport and receipt, limiting prohibitions on possession to
a school zone is not rationally related to enhancing enforcement of the
prohibition on transport.
The jurisdictional element-dependent
possession regulation would have to reach all possession, everywhere,
in order to be a legitimate exercise of power.
It might seem, under this formulation, that Congress could reach
schoolyard possession by prohibiting receipt of a gun from interstate
commerce in a schoolyard. But the problem persists. The regulations
on conditions of receipt need to be rationally related or reasonably
calculated to enhance the enforceability of the regulation of the
channels of interstate commerce. Narrowing the scope of conditions
of receipt to particular types of locations does not so enhance
enforceability of the predicate legislation banning all guns from
interstate commerce.
Congress could only reach schoolyard possession incidentally.
Under the preferred formulation, Congress could enact predicate
legislation denying participation in the interstate commerce of guns to
all schoolchildren.
Regulation of possession of guns by
schoolchildren, without regard to where they possessed the gun of
course, would then enhance enforceability of the valid predicate
enactment.
The predicate legislation, in this example, is not
dependent on the imagined course of a gun, but is rather a regulation
on participation by children in interstate gun commerce. Such
participation could include transport, transmission, and receipt from
interstate commerce of a gun, the regulation of which is greatly
enhanced by possession regulations. Likewise, the felon-in-possession
statutes could validly operate by first excluding all felons from
participation in the interstate commerce of guns, and then regulating
receipt and possession of guns by felons in order to effectively enforce
the denial of participation.
Of course, this depends on interstate commerce of a particular
commodity or participation in interstate commerce by particular
classes of individuals reaching a significant enough level of activity to
support a finding that the regulation of intrastate receipt by
individuals or intrastate possession of certain articles reasonably
operates to enhance the efficacy of enforcement of the predicate
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regulations on shipment or participation in interstate commerce. For
example, in the absence of substantial interstate commerce in a
commodity, say of snow-cones-even if Congress legislated to bar
snow cones from interstate commerce-regulations on the mere
possession of them would not be sufficiently related to the
enforcement efficacy of the predicate regime because possession
would be more likely to evince local receipt than interstate
participation.
The relationship of the possession regulation to the enforcement
efficacy of a valid regulatory regime requires fact-intensive inquiry. In
Raich v. Ashcroft, the question to ask is whether regulating the class
of activities at issue, cultivation and consumption of marijuana on the
advice of a physician, substantially enhances the enforcement efficacy
of an outright prohibition on the particular controlled substance from
interstate commerce. This is a difficult question to be sure, but
arguably more determinate and of greater predictive value than an
attempt to distinguish use of homegrown marijuana from that of
homegrown wheat, or an attempt to distinguish between the effects on
interstate commerce of marijuana by possession attendant to medical
use and that of possession attendant to religious use or otherwise, by
consideration of their effects on demand.
Congress could regulate possession by anyone of an article
prohibited from interstate commerce and could deny participation in
interstate commerce by classes of persons, so long as the secondary
legislation be plainly adapted and narrowly tailored to enhance
enforcement efficacy.
Congress could not reach particularized
intrastate uses of commodities. For example, Congress would be
unable to federally criminalize violence perpetrated by an individual
wielding an object as a weapon that had been received from interstate
commerce. By dispensing with the need to articulate absurd theories
that subsequent possession or use of a commodity-such as
committing a battery with a weapon that had traveled interstatesomehow necessarily affects interstate commerce, the courts may
approach the operative target of the legislation without recourse to
pretext analysis, but rather by testing the statutory possession hook
for its relation to the enforceability of legitimate regulations on the
shipment and receipt of commodities.
Additionally, the fact that particularization may only be incidental
to broader regulatory regimes protects vital political process
safeguards.
In order to incidentally regulate schoolyard gun
possession, Congress would have to first enact an outright prohibition
on the receipt of guns by children from interstate commerce. The
broader the applicability of legislation, the more likely political
pressure will be brought to bear on the negotiation of important
norms.

2004]

RETHINKING POSSESSION

2591

CONCLUSION

Explicitly acknowledging an enforcement efficacy rationale requires
the maintenance of a fairly rigorous, and perhaps artificial, distinction
between modern substantial effects rules and legislation enacted
pursuant to authority to support direct regulations with those
measures necessary and proper to effectively facilitate their
exercise.3 29 However, it is clear that the Scarborough decision, by
accepting a substantial effects rationale for a possession law,33 is
incompatible with the great weight of authority, before and since,
employed by the Court to locate the bases for commerce-enabled
possession regulations. Whatever the most desirable formulation of
the details, it is equally clear that the more coherent explanation for
commerce-enabled possession laws lies in a consideration of the
enforcement efficacy of predicate regulations of the channels of
interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court will ultimately have to confront the
Scarborough presumption3 31 in light of its recent federalism decisions.
This confrontation may or may not occur explicitly if the Court hears
Raich (the CSA is not an explicitly jurisdictional element-dependent
statute),33 2 but when it does, the doctrine will increasingly
acknowledge an enforcement efficacy rationale in order to square
justifications for some possession regulations with contemporary
Commerce Clause doctrine. Focusing on the question of the necessity
of reaching possession in order to effectively regulate valid restrictions
on receipt from, or transport of articles in, interstate commerce, could
impose meaningful limits on congressional power while sustaining
essential legislative tools.
Moreover, by acknowledging that possession laws are enacted
pursuant to a second-order implied power to effectively execute the
commerce power, the resultant judicial treatment of cases such as
Raich333 will not implicate the validity of the vast array of substantial
effects-dependent enactments, including the federal civil rights
regimes.334
Conceived as second-order "necessary and proper"
enactments, controversies implicating possession laws-professed to

329. Admittedly, there are difficulties at the margins.
A consideration of
regulations of "mere" possession of commodities that somehow have a close
relationship to commerce, but are not formally instrumentalities, can devolve into
problematic conflations of the enforcement of transport and receipt regulations with
substantial effects or instrumentality doctrines. However, the construction and
careful maintenance of interpretive guidelines can manage the risk of unacceptable
indeterminacy.
330. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
331. See supra Part III.A.
332. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000).
333. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
334. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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have been enacted pursuant to the commerce power-perhaps are not
Commerce Clause cases at all."'

335. Of course, Madison's warning remains especially relevant: "[I]t must be
wholly immaterial, whether unlimited powers be exercised under the name of
unlimited powers, or be exercised under the name of unlimited means of carrying into
execution, limited powers." James Madison, The Report of 1800, in 17 The Papers of
James Madison 303, 335 (David B. Mattern ed., 1991).

